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Article 2

BRINGING CANDOR TO CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS
DAVID ADAM FRIEDMAN *
The American public donates a staggering amount of money to
nonprofit charities. These charities routinely solicit and receive
money from donors for specific, earmarked purposes. Often, however, charities ignore their obligations to use money for these designated uses. In many circumstances, even a seemingly benign redirection of earmarked gifts for other charitable purposes could
constitute fraud and misrepresentation.
Breaking the implicit or explicit promise to use money in a designated manner harms donors, charities, and the public. Prospective donors assess the value of charitable donations in a manner
similar to the way they value consumer goods and services and can
be swayed by false claims. Accordingly, allowing distortions of
perceived value misleads donors when they are directing their
charity.
In light of detailed examinations of charitable-organization
spending practices, this Article will propose that charities should
adhere to a new, higher level of candor in their public communications. Maintaining a renewed, scrupulous approach to disclosure would, in Chief Justice John Marshall’s parlance in Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, ensure “that the charity will
flow . . . in the channel” that the donors expressly choose.
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INTRODUCTION
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 Chief Justice John
Marshall observed that donors are motivated to give because of the “pleasing
hope” that the charity will use the gift for the donors’ intended purpose:
It requires no very critical examination of the human mind to enable us to determine, that one great inducement to these [charitable] gifts is the conviction felt by the giver, that the disposition he
makes of them is immutable . . . . All such gifts are made in the
pleasing, perhaps delusive, hope that the charity will flow forever
in the channel which the givers have marked out for it.2
Today, as then, charities routinely solicit and receive money from donors for specific, earmarked uses. Often, however, charities do not technically fulfill their obligations to use money for those designated uses. Dishonoring these claims harms donors, charities, and the public. This Article
will argue that requiring a new, higher level of candor from charities in their

1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
2. Id. at 647 (emphasis added); see Allison Anna Tait, The Secret Economy of Charitable
Giving, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1663, 1716 (2015) (noting the durability of these words).
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fundraising communications will ensure, in Chief Justice Marshall’s parlance, “that the charity will flow . . . in the channel” that the donors select. 3
The American public donated a staggering $410 billion to charities in
2017, representing over two percent of gross domestic product. 4 Individual
donors accounted for nearly eighty percent of that giving, 5 with education
and human service 6 charities receiving the largest aggregate amount, a combined twenty-six percent. 7 Put starkly, in 2017, individual donors collectively gave nearly six times more money than all foundations combined. 8
The sheer magnitude of the economic role of individual philanthropy invites
an examination into the routine practices for raising that money. 9
Charities persuade donors through “the provision of information . . . and
promotion.” 10 Though donation solicitations differ from consumer advertising pitches that aim to induce traditional market exchanges, they seek to yield
similar transactional decisions. 11 Price points, combined with other claims,
influence where funds go. Charities confront this dynamic just like sellers of

3. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 647.
4. Giving Statistics, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=42 (last visited Apr. 15, 2019) (citing GIVING USA, THE
ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY (2018)).
5. Id. (including bequests in this number).
6. Human service charities, as defined by Charity Navigator, include children’s and family
services, youth development, shelter, and crisis services, food banks and pantries, human service
organizations (for example, YMCA, YWCA and the Red Cross), homeless services, and social services.
Human Services, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.categories&categoryid=6 (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).
7. Giving Statistics, supra note 4.
PHILANTHROPIC
TRUST,
8. See
Charitable
Giving
Statistics,
NAT’L
https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2019).
9. The demographics of giving, with lower-income and older households donating more as a
percentage of income than others, also warrant concern. See John A. List, The Market for Charitable Giving, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 157, 166 (2011) (decomposing giving by demographics).
List’s decomposition includes giving to religious organizations, but this Article focuses on the solicitation practices of providers of non-religious charitable goods and services, which also includes
religiously-affiliated providers of charity, such as Catholic Charities.
10. Marco A. Castaneda et al., Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to
Nonprofits, 24 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 215, 216 (2008). The United States Supreme Court recognized
that charitable solicitation and communication of information about causes are intertwined, stating:
[C]haritable appeals for funds . . . involve . . . communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas . . . . Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but . . . must be undertaken with due regard for the
reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech . . . and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
11. “[W]hen there are strings attached to donations, those revenues are essentially akin to
sales.” Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and its Financing, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO
PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 15 (Burton A.
Weisbrod ed., 1998).
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soap and electronics. As the proverb goes, “If charity cost nothing, the world
would be full of philanthropists.” 12
Individual donors 13 have a vast choice of charities for their philanthropy. 14 Therefore, charities must compete to raise money. 15 According to
one model, charities compete by manipulating the “implicit price” of donations, 16 reflected in the amount of the gift that the donor believes will directly
support the expected charitable goods and services, as opposed to other programmatic expenses and other uses. 17 One issue with implicit pricing, however, is the amount of money leaked to overhead functions and fundraising. 18
The implicit pricing of individual donations affects their ultimate
amount and distribution. 19 Solicitations persuade individuals to give (versus
not give) or to choose one recipient over another. 20 Charitable claims inform
choices and substitution decisions, just like other consumer claims, 21 driving
the ultimate allocation of charitable funding. Therefore, the candor of these
representations becomes critical to donors, recipients, and the larger public
interest because they shape the output of the entire nonprofit sector. Charitable candor ensures that the donor’s implicit price reflects the true destination of funding and inspires confidence in charities.
The fungible nature of money creates an opportunity for mischief—for
charities to dishonor the letter and spirit of a promised earmarked use. Fun-

12. PAUL G. BLACKETOR, EVERYDAY USEFUL QUOTES 310 (2009). This saying has been attributed to Yiddish humorist Leo Rosten, although it also appears without attribution as a Jewish
proverb. John Peloza & Piers Steel, The Price Elasticities of Charitable Contributions: A MetaAnalysis, 24 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 260, 260 (2005); BLACKETOR, supra, at 310.
13. I use the term “donors” to refer to the “individual donors” who contribute the vast bulk of
dollars, even though corporations, foundations, and other entities also donate to charities. See Giving Statistics, supra note 4.
14. In 2015, over one million public charities claimed tax-exempt status. Brice McKeever,
The Nonprofit Sector in Brief, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STAT. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://nccs.urban.org/project/nonprofit-sector-brief.
15. See generally Castaneda et al., supra note 10, at 215–18 (discussing models of competition
for donations in the nonprofit sector).
16. For the purposes of this Article, I will use “implicit price” to describe the donor’s overall
perceived value of donations, including expectations that charities will honor specifically-promised,
earmarked uses of the money made in solicitations.
17. Castaneda et al., supra note 10, at 216.
18. See Cagla Okten & Burton A. Weisbrod, Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit
Markets, 75 J. PUB. ECON. 255, 255–57 (2000). Additionally, some literature assesses the effect of
income tax policy on the implicit pricing of donations. See, e.g., Gerald E. Auten, et al., The Effects
of Tax Reform on Charitable Contributions, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 267 (1992); William S. Reece, Charitable Contributions: New Evidence on Household Behavior, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 142 (1979).
19. See Letter from BBB Wise Giving All., GuideStar, and Charity Navigator to Donors of
America
(2013),
http://s5770.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/GS_OverheadMyth_Ltr_ONLINE.pdf.
20. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Charitable Giving and “Excessive Fundraising,” 97 Q. J. ECON.
193, 194 (1982).
21. Id.
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gible funding enables charities to spend incremental money on entirely different uses from those designated by the donor. 22 New donations enable
charities to shift funding from specific, solicited purposes to other discretionary uses, or simply toward activities less attractive for soliciting donations. 23
This ability to put solicited money into one earmarked pocket in public, and
subsequently, when the public looks the other way, take money out of that
very pocket for other uses, disregards donor intent.
Solicitation claims that create an implicit price gap are not easily selfcorrecting. For markets to correct false claims, donors need the capability to
assess the truthfulness of the claim after the gift transaction.24 Donors would,
as a general matter, find it difficult to see precisely how organizations use
their gifts because the details of charitable operations are not publicly visible.
An individual donor to a complex university or medical charity might need a
forensic accountant with full access to financial and operational information
of the organization to determine whether their funds had the expected incremental impact on the recipient organization. In order for markets to reflect
and incorporate the charity’s actual behavior, the donor would need to ascertain whether the represented implicit price reflected the true expected value
of the donation. Opacity makes that scenario unlikely.
Donor ignorance of this dynamic offers no comfort. As Judge Frank
Easterbrook noted in a case where a manufacturer made fraudulent advertising claims to consumers about the pain-relieving effects of its product, “One
important reason for requiring truth is so that competition in the market will
lead to appropriate prices. Selling brass as gold harms consumers independent of any effect on pain.” 25 Requiring truth is equally important for compe-

22. The charitable sector maintains no monopoly on the fungibility phenomenon. The ability
to flexibly deploy fungible resources contrary to promised use presents challenges well beyond the
charitable sector, including in public fiscal budgeting and foreign-aid spending. See, e.g., Tarhan
Feyzioglu et al., A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid, 12 WORLD BANK ECON.
REV. 29 (1998) (explaining how fungibility of foreign aid makes it difficult to discern impacts on
projects); Howard Pack & Janet Rothenberg Pack, Foreign Aid and the Question of Fungibility, 75
REV. ECON. & STAT. 258, 258 (1993) (discussing how fungibility of aid “thwart[s]” donor intent).
Fungibility concerns have been much more voluble when federal budget spending over controversial causes have been at issue. See Mary Katherine Ham, NYT Very Concerned About Fungibility
of Money in Charity; Not So Much in Federal Gov’t, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/nyt-very-concerned-about-fungibility-of-money-in-charity-notso-much-in-federal-govt/article/271545 (analogizing concerns about transparency and accountability with respect to fungibility and use of charitable donations to concerns about the fungibility of
health care funding and abortion); David Saperstein, Appropriate and Inappropriate Use of Religion, in SACRED PLACES, CIVIC PURPOSES: SHOULD GOVERNMENT HELP FAITH-BASED CHARITY?
303 (E.J. Dionne Jr. & Ming Hsu Chen eds., 2001) (“[E]very dollar in the church budget freed up
by government funding is going to be used for religious activities.”).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See David Adam Friedman, Refining Advertising Regulation, 49 CONN. L. REV. 837, 843–
53 (2017).
25. FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2008).
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tition in markets for donations, if solicitations are to generate accurate implicit pricing calculations. Donors are harmed by misdirection of their funds
to non-earmarked uses. Truth-telling charities also suffer. The charities that
create an implicit pricing gap through dishonest means draw resources away
from those that use full candor in their earmarked solicitations, thus harming
charities that honor these commitments.
In this Article, I will urge the charitable sector to close the implicit price
gap by self-policing a higher standard for solicitation claims. Charities
should adopt a revised “Donor Bill of Rights” 26 that commits them to use full
candor in donor communications, especially with respect to earmarked uses
of money. If successful, the sector could elevate fundraising practices without incurring high compliance costs. If self-policing fails, enforcement agencies could prosecute nonprofits that employ deception to generate implicit
price gaps. Though serious and egregious instances of charitable misrepresentations warrant and already receive enforcement attention,27 these more
routine solicitation practices should not remain ignored. Some of these practices may even meet the common law elements of fraud and misrepresentation, and the public should no longer tolerate them.
This Article will proceed in four major parts. In Part I, I will discuss the
motivations for charitable donations. I will further explain the concept of
implicit pricing and how charities use solicitation to manipulate implicit pricing to induce donations. With that underpinning, in Part II, I will describe
and illustrate the specific problem of honoring earmarked donor intent where
donations are fungible. I will show that raising money for particular purposes, and then directing that money elsewhere, constitutes misrepresentation and fraud. I will also explore the problems created by fungibility in a
variety of contexts and the associated deficiencies in the current Donor Bill
of Rights, the voluntary code established by philanthropy watchdogs. Part
III will propose revising the Donor Bill of Rights to require participants to
use full candor—to be “scrupulously ethical” in public communications. 28
Failing that, public enforcement agencies can focus resources on these marketing tactics. Part IV will conclude that increased candor will lead to improved allocations of charitable funding and higher public confidence in the
charitable sector.
26. ASS’N OF FUNDRAISING PROFESSIONALS ET AL., A DONOR BILL OF RIGHTS (1993),
https://afpglobal.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2018-10/DonorBillofRights.pdf (last visited
Mar. 3, 2018) [hereinafter DONOR BILL OF RIGHTS].
27. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC, States Settle Claims Against Two Entities Claiming to
Be Cancer Charities; Orders Require Entities to Be Dissolved and Ban Leader from Working for
Non-Profits (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/03/ftc-statessettle-claims-against-two-entities-claiming-be-cancer. The FTC put a sizable sham cancer operation out of business, one that “allegedly bilked more than $187 million from donors.” Id. In this
instance, the FTC alleged that the charities’ operators directed a miniscule fraction of donor money
toward cancer charities, redirecting the operations to their self-benefit. Id.
28. OR. ADMIN. R. 583-030-0035(12) (2015); see infra note 305 and accompanying text.
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I. CLASSIC PROBLEMS WITH FUNDRAISING CLAIMS
When does a false fundraising claim rise to the level of common law
misrepresentation or fraud? When charities outright lie and steal, they provide easy cases. 29 When fundraising involves other, less-obviously misleading behavior, however, the common law offers guidance to resolving such
cases. The law of misrepresentation and fraud squarely addresses commercial pecuniary transactions, but the principles also hold for fundraising transactions. Essentially, the fundraising charity makes representations that the
donor should be able to rely upon when deciding whether to donate, to what
cause, and for which purpose. 30 In other words, resources should flow toward
where donors intend them to flow. The social importance of the sector warrants requiring more candor in fundraising disclosures.
To contextualize this problem, Section I.A reviews the established consensus around the varied motivations for individuals to make charitable donations. Section I.B observes that charities convey a price for their charitable
goods and services to donors through their representations. If solicitations
mislead donors about the implicit price of donation, such solicitations will
misdirect charitable giving. Section I.C dissects a recent example of intentional solicitation misrepresentation and fraud—a flagrant example involving
cancer research fundraising, settled by the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) and the states. Classic fraud proves obviously damaging to donors
and the public. Though less blatant, the damage from misdirecting earmarked funds bears a conceptual resemblance. Donors expect value from the
implicit price of their donation, and here, their donation yields almost no
value. Finally, in Section I.D, in order to further flesh out the challenges
presented by funding fungibility, I offer a high-profile scenario where, due to
impossibility, a well-intended charity simply could not use solicited earmarked money as directed. Unlike routine fungibility problems, this tangle
received high scrutiny because the intended beneficiaries were the victims of
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. This much rarer scenario shows
that even with the drag of candor, candid charities will have an easier time
exercising discretion for fund use, and charities need to balance those considerations when soliciting donors.
A. Why Do People Donate to Charities?
As Professor Anna Tait observes, “gift-giving . . . is not solely a bilateral exchange with easily-definable, material benefits accruing to each party.
Rather, gift-giving is a complicated form of exchange that provides a donor
with numerous intangible benefits and operates within an intricate system of

29. See infra Section I.C.
30. See infra Section II.A.
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social networks and cultural norms.” 31 Economists and sociologists have dissected these underlying components to understand the motivations for charitable donations. 32 A review of these motivations situates the importance of
charities honoring promises to use funds for earmarked purposes.
Individuals make charitable donations for a host of reasons, in addition
to the ability to focus their money on creating specific forms of charitable
production. An exhaustive meta-analysis of the charitable-giving literature
concluded, “[T]he most important forces that drive charitable giving [are] [1]
awareness of need; [2] solicitation; [3] costs and benefits; [4] altruism; [5]
reputation; 33 [6] psychological benefits; [7] values; [and] [8] efficacy.” 34
When charities make specific representations in solicitations about how
funds will be used, but the charity operators use the fungible nature of the
gift to direct those funds elsewhere, they make use of several of these forces.
“Solicitation” proves of paramount importance because approximately
eighty-five percent of all giving follows an affirmative solicitation, such as a
fundraising letter or a personal request. 35 When donors know who will specifically benefit, this enhanced “awareness of need” drives likeliness to
give. 36 The power of solicitation combined with creation of the awareness of
need can serve as a proxy for the power of the charity’s representation that a
donation will be used for a specific, earmarked purpose. 37
As for “cost and benefits,” they hinge in some part on the “psychological
benefits of donations.” 38 Professor Christine Exley catalogs some of these
“potential motives” in more detail, 39 citing studies that show “people feel

31. Tait, supra note 2, at 1702.
32. Tait offers a comprehensive, but concise, overview of “charitable giving as [squarely] situated in a complex gift economy.” Id. at 1702.
33. “Reputation” folds into other motivations driven by “signaling status” and prestige of donation. For an overview of the power of “signaling status,” see Tait, supra note 2, at 1704–07.
34. René Bekkers & Pamala Wiepking, A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Philanthropy: Eight Mechanisms that Drive Charitable Giving, 40 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR
Q. 924, 924 (2011). “An overwhelming body of knowledge is available on philanthropy in the
social sciences . . . from very different disciplines, including marketing, economics, social psychology, biological psychology, neurology and brain sciences, sociology, political science, anthropology, biology, and evolutionary psychology.” Id. To focus on the narrower legal questions at hand,
a general sweep of the literature offers context, but a summary must suffice.
35. Id. at 931 (citing Bryant et al., Participating in Philanthropic Activities: Donating Money
and Time, 26 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 43 (2003)).
36. Id. at 930.
37. Reputation might not matter in the earmark context if this variable purely concerns appearances of generosity, virtue, and financial strength, rather than expected substantive charitable production.
38. Id. at 948–49. The meta-analysis treated psychological benefits as a supporting magnification of the other forces and did not separately explore the “feel-good” benefit of donations. Id.
39. Christine L. Exley, Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk, 83 REV.
ECON. STUD. 587, 587 (2015).
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good about themselves when they help others,” 40 wish to “appear[] nice to
others,” 41 and comport with “social norms.” 42 She notes that “these motives,
as well as standard economic models, may easily explain a common finding
in charitable giving: individuals give less when there is a greater risk that
their donation will have less impact.” 43 Exley made a significant contribution
by determining through experimentation that given these desires, potential
donors may use “charity risk” as an excuse for not giving. 44
If donations diminish due to informational uncertainty about impact, total welfare diminishes. 45 Of course, individuals enjoy utility from gift giving,
even if some of the value may be lost in the gift transfer. The literature about
person-to-person gift-giving offers some context for understanding what distinguishes gifts from other transactions. Professor Joel Waldfogel revealed
that “between a tenth and a third of the value of holiday gifts is destroyed by
gift-giving.” 46 In the Waldfogel study, gift recipients quantified the gap between the estimated price paid for received gifts and their own personal valuation of the gifts. 47
If person-to-person gift-giving destroys value, why is gift-giving ubiquitous? One explanation for this behavior is that gift-giving carries unique
social importance, and many scholars have emphasized that point. 48 Profes-

40. Id. (first citing James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J., 464 (1990); then citing James Andreoni, Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1447 (1989)).
41. Id. (citing, for example, Daniel Ariely et al., Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation
and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 544 (2009)).
42. Id. (citing James Andreoni & B. Douglas Bernheim, Social Image and the 50–50 Norm: A
Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects, 77 ECONOMETRICA 1607 (2009)).
43. Id. (emphasis added) (first citing J. Michelle Brock et al., Dictating the Risk: Experimental
Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 415 (2013); then citing Michal
Krawczyk & Fabrice Le Lec, “Give Me a Chance!” An Experiment in Social Decision Under Risk,
13 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 500 (2010)).
44. See id. at 589–90. Through experiments, she finds that study participants will weigh heavily the riskiness of a charitable lottery payout against a charitable payout for themselves. Id.
45. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). When information asymmetry about non-commodity goods (like used cars) pervades a market, buyers may value the goods at a price lower than that
of the seller. Id. at 489–90. The transactions that might result with more trustworthy information
about the goods might not happen, leading to a suboptimal welfare outcome. Id. A risk of fraud
drives the buyers’ valuation lower, making transactions less likely to occur. Id. The ultimate use
of charitable donations may prove even more opaque than the prospective performance of used cars.
Id. The riskier charitable donations appear, the less likely they will occur or occur at the quantity
they might with more informational certainty. Id. at 488.
46. Joel Waldfogel, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1328, 1336
(1993). See generally JOEL WALDFOGEL, SCROOGENOMICS: WHY YOU SHOULDN’T BUY
PRESENTS FOR THE HOLIDAYS (2009).
47. Waldfogel, supra note 46, at 1330–33.
48. In his original study, Waldfogel did not address the social benefits of giving squarely. See
generally Waldfogel, supra note 46.
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sor Eric Posner observes that person-to-person giving creates value by communicating “gratitude” and hope for reciprocity. 49 Twenty years after Waldfogel’s study, a survey of economists revealed a strong reluctance to downplay the social value of gift-giving. 50 For example, Professor Alan Auerbach
replied that Waldfogel’s conclusion that cash transfers were superior to gifts
was “[c]learly true if one ignores the pleasure one may get in choosing or
receiving specific gifts.” 51 Professor Barry Eichengreen observed that
“[i]mplications of a specific gift (signal it sends, behavioral impact) may give
additional utility to either the giver or receiver.” 52
Ideally, social value would be maximized after resources are transferred
through gifting, but “social value” proves complex to define in this context.
People feel good about making gifts, among the other identified motives, but
gifts given inefficiently, or based on misinformation, come at some social
cost. With person-to-person gift giving, the risks of giving are different from
that of the charitable donation. The person-to-person giver has different motivations and may wish to convey sentiment as much as transfer wealth. 53
The doting relative likely knows that the cash price they paid for their gift
might not match the non-sentimental value attached to the gift by the recipient. After all, doting relatives receive gifts, too. The person-to-person giver
knows full well who the recipient is and can speculate about what the recipient might do with the gift.
A charitable donor may, like the person-to-person giver, also be motivated by sentiment. Charities, however, can exploit the so-called “warm
glow” element of giving. 54 By framing donations as directed for one specific
purpose, the donor can feel good about the impact of a gift. Does the donor
have the same giving-impact awareness of the aforementioned doting relative? Does the donor merely want to feel good about purpose-based giving,
but with a wink that it might not incrementally support that particular purpose? These questions prove difficult to answer satisfactorily, but more highquality information would certainly help the donor. Just as an Amazon Wish
List or wedding registry can aid a person-to-person gift-giver, full-candor
49. Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises,
1997 WISC. L. REV. 567, 569 (1997).
50. See Bah Humbug, IGM FORUM, (Dec. 17, 2013, 1:03 PM), http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/bah-humbug.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. According to economist Professor David Autor, “Presents serve multiple interpersonal purposes. Revealed preference indicates that income transfer is not the primary one.” Id.
54. For a discussion of the “warm glow” factor, see Tait, supra note 2, at 1711–12. See also
Heidi Crumpler & Philip J. Grossman, An Experimental Test of Warm Glow Giving, 92 J. PUB.
ECON. 1011, 1011–12 (2008) (donors are motivated by both pure altruism, conferring a pure benefit
to the recipient, and separately, “warm glow”—the personal joy of giving); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Altruism, Nonprofits and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 701, 712–13 (1996). See generally
Andreoni, supra note 40.
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disclosures about specified use might help the charitable donor, without significantly cooling down the warm glow. The giver-donor is free to ignore or
discount the candid disclosures and give accordingly.
The “wide range of possible objects of charity” naturally can overwhelm
donors 55 who ultimately must select some forms of charitable production
over others. 56 Donors attempt to make choices among causes to satisfy personal preferences, 57 thus “it comes as no surprise that ‘[t]he choice of what
to support lies at the heart of defining a strategy for giving.’” 58 As Professor
Usha Rodrigues observes, charities sell “identity” through their solicitation. 59
Taking that observation one step further, donors choose the charitable production with which they want to identify. If the substance of the choice lies
at the heart of the strategy for giving, the candor of the presentation of that
substance, as offered through solicitation, becomes critical.
Charities and regulators have incentives and duties to ensure that charitable donations reach an optimal level and appropriate use. Mitigating some
of the risk of the potential misuse or misallocation of donations could lead to
more donations. One way to reduce risk is to address the implicit price gap
that results from misuse of fungible donations. The implicit price of a donation incorporates the risk that the funds will be used in their intended way. If
charities committed to more candor in their solicitations, this risk would diminish.
B. The Implicit Price of Donation and the Implicit Price Gap
The market for donations shares various attributes with traditional consumer markets, and conceptualizing donations through the lens of a price for
an expected value proves helpful for analyzing the impact of distorted
claims. 60 The decision to donate resembles any decision to transact. The
donor must decide whether to give at all or save resources for personal consumption. If the donor chooses to give, the donor must decide to which recipient, and if possible, for what specific purpose. The donor also has the
option to create charitable goods and services personally, by donating volunteer hours, for example. The lower the price for the charitable goods and
services, all things being equal, the more likely the donation, and the greater
the magnitude of donation.

55. Tait, supra note 2, at 1708 (exploring this concept and the supporting literature).
56. See generally FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE
PHILANTHROPY 32–33 (1995).
57. See PETER FRUMKIN, STRATEGIC GIVING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PHILANTHROPY 147
(2006).
58. Tait, supra note 2, at 1708 (citing FRUMKIN, supra note 57, at 147).
59. Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L. J. 1257, 1283 (2011). See generally
Tait, supra note 2, at 1707–10.
60. See generally Castaneda et al., supra note 10, at 215–18.
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In a competitive environment for fundraising, solicitations will make
claims about degree and concentration of impact. 61 The donor will assess
whether the charity will provide the best opportunity for making the desired
impact for their dollar. Solicitation claims drive the perception of the price—
the implicit price of the donation.62 Fraudulent or misleading claims attempt
to lower the apparent implicit price in order to induce a donation, a larger
donation, or cause the donor to choose their charity over a rival. These troublesome claims might be made for the purpose of personal self-enrichment
of the charity operators, as in the case of the cancer scam described below, 63
or they may merely be made as a more benign, yet still troublesome, puffed
attempt to induce a donation to one “legitimate” charity over another.
Merely puffed-up representations may not appear as damaging to donation markets. Competition based on false claims, however, leads donors to
make choices not in accord with their wishes, causing them injury. 64 Also,
honest charities, presenting lower, but truthful, apparent implicit prices, lose
out to the less honest charities. 65
Put differently, where donors have the “ability to contract” 66 with charities for the production of specific charitable goods and services, the implicit
price of the donation lowers, making giving more attractive. 67 That is, when
donors have contractual-like confidence that a donation will support a specific purpose rather than a broader purpose, the resulting lower implicit price
should induce more donations for that purpose. 68 Like other goods and services, the demand for charitable goods and services exhibits price elasticity. 69

61. See, e.g., ROBIN HOOD, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2016), http://2016.robinhood.org/assets/pdfs/Robin-Hood-Annual-Report-2016.pdf (“At the heart of Robin Hood’s grant making process is our rigorous metrics, a disciplined system to carefully analyze each grant to determine its
benefit-cost ratio.”).
62. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
63. See infra Section I.C.
64. The California Supreme Court recognizes this premise in markets for goods:
For each consumer who relies on the truth and accuracy of a label and is deceived by
misrepresentations into making a purchase, the economic harm is the same: the consumer
has purchased a product that he or she paid more for than he or she otherwise might have
been willing to pay if the product had been labeled accurately. This economic harm—
the loss of real dollars from a consumer’s pocket—is the same whether or not a court
might objectively view the products as functionally equivalent.
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 890 (Cal. 2011). I extend this to the market for
charitable goods and services.
65. As one Nobel Laureate famously observed, dishonest practices tend to prevail over honest
practices, if left unchecked. See Akerlof, supra note 45, at 488, 495.
66. See generally Castaneda et al., supra note 10 (using the term “ability to contract”).
67. Id. at 216.
68. Id.
69. See generally Peloza & Steel, supra note 12 (discussing a meta-analysis of studies of the
impact of tax-deductibility on giving).
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Donors are willing to give more to charity at a lower price. 70 When the implicit price appears higher or lower for any reason, the price elasticity should
determine amount and incidence of donations.
To attract more donations, charities can manipulate the apparent implicit
price, while not altering any previously-committed spending targets on contracted charitable production. A charity can compete for dollars by contracting with donors to use money for specific purposes, even if additional money
ultimately does not incrementally increase the charity’s planned budget line
for that specific purpose. 71 The charities can use attractive donation targets
as a low implicit price to lure fungible contributions or declare that they will
not put the funds to less attractive-appearing use, like overhead spending. 72
Organizations can still redirect incrementally-raised money to support other,
less market-attractive, activities. 73 The fungible nature of money enables
charities to deviate from assurances made in solicitation claims to reflect the
charity’s preferential uses. 74
If the implicit price reflects an accurate donor understanding of the impact of a donation in creating charitable goods and services, the donation
transaction will clear. A donor interested in supporting the local hospital may
be content giving a gift for general use, even knowing that some of the money
might be spent on widening parking spaces for surgeons, rather than on extra
staffing for the burn unit. The implicit price might be right, if all is known
and disclosed. Another donor might have different preferences. For this donor, a general gift to one hospital would lose out to a gift dedicated to a burn
unit at a different hospital, again, because the donor is seeking out the lowest
implicit price for creating the charitable goods and services they seek.
An implicit price gap emerges when a charity makes a false claim or
obscures a claim that artificially makes the implicit price appear lower. When
the apparent price deviates downward from what the price would be without
the false or obscured claim, a gap appears that, if left uncorrected, will lead
to market distortions. 75 In the case of a complete fraud, discussed in the next
70. For a broader discussion of the centrality of tax incentives to the “modern charitable bargain,” see Tait, supra note 2, at 1700–02.
71. See, e.g., infra Section II.B.1 (discussing GiveWell’s analysis of Aravind Eye Care System
and Smile Train).
72. The overhead spending issue sparked a debate due to its centrality to certain fundraising
efforts and effectiveness measurement. See infra Section II.B.2.
73. See infra Section II.B.
74. “[M]oney is in fact different from other social goods: more fungible, remarkably mobile,
and highly transferable . . . .” VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 214 (1994).
The concept of fungibility of money applies across many dimensions and social constructs, including welfare relief and personal budgeting. See generally id. at 170–98 (discussing budgeting and
“earmarking”).
75. Market failures emerge when “consumers lack information about the quality or nature of a
product, and therefore cannot make utility-maximizing purchasing decisions.” ROBERT S. PINDYCK
& DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 290 (3d ed. 1995). See generally Akerlof, supra note
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Section, the implicit price gap would be infinite because no charitable production happens at any price. 76
In contrast, in the case of overshooting a fundraising target without ill
intent, as in the disaster relief example in Section I.D., 77 the challenge for the
charity rests in honoring the represented implicit price given changed circumstances. 78 The charity can aim to create an equivalent or close substitute for
the promised charitable production via cy pres 79 or offer to return the donation. The better the charity’s efforts, and the more transparent, the stronger
the donors’ confidence should be. Charities can close the implicit price gap
with an open and demonstrated commitment to candor. Closing the implicit
price gap leads to an environment where donor wishes match more closely
with charitable production, and honest charities prevail.
C. Problems with “Ill-intended” Fundraising Claims
An outrageous case of charitable fraud provides a clear starting point for
examining the basic principles behind implicit price and the need to close the
implicit price gap. The pursuit of troublesome fundraising claims involves
making tradeoffs about directing energies at singular, obvious, prolific cases,
while also ensuring that routine fundraising efforts maintain integrity.
Though I focus more on the trouble invoked by the more routine cases involving earmarks and fungibility, the spectacular fraud of Cancer Fund of
America starkly illustrates the harm that results from false fundraising
claims.
When the charitable offering has zero value, enforcement agencies can
act with easy justification. If the implicit price exceeds zero, donors suffer
injury from having their money misdirected to scammers, rather than directed
towards generating the charitable output that they expected. Dissection of a
large-scale charitable fraud also can reveal a clear picture of the social costs
of any lesser lapse of solicitation integrity, including misdirected earmarked
funds.
When a charity functions like a racket, all solicitations constitute fraud
and misrepresentation, and FTC v. Cancer Fund of America 80 provides an
extreme baseline for illustrating the concept of the implicit price gap. This
scam resulted in “the largest joint enforcement action ever undertaken by the

45, at 488. For a specific illustration, see Dhruv Grewal & Larry D. Compeau, Comparative Price
Advertising: Informative or Deceptive?, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 52, 54–56 (1992) (documenting a meta-analysis of welfare losses resulting from bad-faith manipulation of discount pricing).
76. See infra Section I.C.
77. See infra notes 102–115 and accompanying text.
78. See infra Section I.D.
79. See infra Section I.D (discussing the cy pres doctrine).
80. No. 2:15-cv-00884-NVW (D. Ariz. filed May 18, 2015).
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FTC and state charity regulators.” 81 The enforcement agencies alleged that
four nonprofits conned $187 million from donors who expected to support
cancer sufferers. 82
Fungibility abuse does not leap out as the primary way to characterize
this scam. All of this donated money, however, was fungible enough to line
the pockets of the operators and for years evade detection, even at the high
volume of activity and visibility required to raise such funds. 83 According to
the complaint, the defendant “sham charities” and associated individual defendants “engaged in a massive, nationwide fraud.” 84 They told potential
donors “that their contributions [would] help people suffering from cancer,
but instead, [spent] the overwhelming majority of donated funds supporting
the Individual Defendants, their families and friends, and their fundraisers.” 85
The defendants used a well-developed accounting scheme to “appear to be
larger [in size] and more efficient with donors’ dollars than they actually
were, deceiving the donating public.” 86
The expressed fundraising purposes were broadly focused around supporting cancer patients, including children, and specifically, patients with
breast cancer. 87 The operators effectively recognized that by making specific
representations about where solicited funds would go, they could lower the
apparent implicit price of donations, thus attracting more money. The cancer
charities described “specific programs that donors’ contributions supposedly
would support” such as pain medication for children, patient transportation
to chemotherapy, and hospice care. 88 As the FTC and state plaintiffs put it
in the Complaint, “These were lies.” 89 None of these specific programs existed, the promoters used them to draw funding, or more bluntly, scam funding. 90
Unlike the more benign-appearing, fungibility-focused instances explored below—where donations effectively support the charitable institution,
but just not in the manner advertised—the donations in this case did not assist
81. Press Release, FTC, supra note 27. The action involved all fifty states and the District of
Columbia. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Complaint at 15, FTC v. Cancer Fund of Am., No. 2:15-cv-00884-NVW (D. Ariz. May 18,
2015).
85. Id. Even with legitimate charities, fundraising expenses raise controversy, but this example
reaches beyond the pale.
See Overhead Ratios Are Essential for Informed Giving,
CHARITYWATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-articles/overhead-ratios-are-essential-for-informed-giving/133 (last visited Apr. 18, 2019) (discussing fundraising and overhead expenditures).
86. Complaint, supra note 84, at 16.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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cancer patients or serve any other means of charity. 91 Instead, the donations
flowed to the pockets of private individuals for their own ill-gotten gain. As
the complaint put it, the “diversion of charitable funds . . . deceived donors
and wasted millions of dollars that could have been spent as donors intended,
to help Americans suffering from cancer.” 92
The Cancer Fund of America matter starkly presents two dynamics that
coincide with false solicitation claims, both evident in other fungible money
scenarios. 93 First, the scammers here expertly marketed their charity to appeal to people who wanted to have an incremental impact on cancer patients
in concrete ways. Second, money donated at a falsely-low implicit price diverted money away from where donors thought it would go, defeating the
honest players in the market who could also deliver like charitable goods and
services. 94
An opportunity to help alleviate pain for suffering children, for example,
presents a low implicit price for creating more of that charitable good than a
broader, unrestricted donation to a charity like the American Cancer Society.
It appears that the true budget for child pain relief in Cancer Fund of America
was fixed, but fixed near zero. Although magnitude of the implicit price gap
is nearly infinite due to the fraud, the concept of the implicit price gap is the
same as if the charity truly fixed the budget for children’s medication at
$10,000,000 and stole the rest. 95 If a charity solicited incremental money for
child pain relief, and the incremental money was spent elsewhere, like on
large grants to establish research centers, this practice would dishonor the
promoted implicit price.
Cancer Fund of America presents a pure form of fraud and misrepresentation in solicitation, as the charity absolutely intended to make false promises about use of funds. However, as discussed in the next Section, some
charities intend to keep promises about spending, but due to unanticipated
circumstances, cannot keep them. These charities do, however, attempt to
close the unanticipated implicit price gap, and their efforts tell us about the
importance of matching donor intent to use. Although fungible money could
be put to other charitable uses, when a solicited cause becomes overfunded
in a sudden manner, some charities seek to find the best, if still imperfect,
way to honor intent.

91. In this case, less than three percent of the raised money reached cancer patients. See
“Sham” Cancer Charities Settle Massive Fraud Case, CBS NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sham-cancer-charities-settle-massive-fraud-case/.
92. Id.
93. For detailed illustrations of these scenarios, see infra Section II.B.
94. See Akerlof, supra note 45, at 488.
95. Assume that even a legitimate cancer fund would cap the budget somewhere because a
certain amount would more than cover any need. Only so many children need medication funding
during any given period.
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D. Problems with “Well-Intended” Fundraising Claims
Sometimes, charities can actually use the fungibility of donated money
to help donors realize their implicit price, rather than use fungibility as a device to enable the charity to break a promise quietly. After the honoring of a
well-intended charitable promise becomes impracticable or impossible, principles of cy pres 96 can support putting that money to use in a similar fashion. 97
In the immediate aftermath of unprecedented tragic events, like extreme
natural disasters or terrorist attacks, carefully-crafted fundraising appeals and
targeted fundraising goals may appear less important in light of the immediacy and uncertain dimensions of need. These circumstances can lead to the
application of cy pres, which “contemplates an application [of the gift] ‘as
near as possible’ to that specified by the donor.” 98 Here, unlike the challenges presented in some instances of cy pres, significant time has not lapsed
to render the original gift too outdated to implement. 99
As has been long observed, “[t]he ideal charitable gift clearly expresses
the donor’s intention, yet is flexible enough to be accommodated to later radical changes in the circumstances surrounding the gift. But all too often these
gifts are impulsively conceived, indefinitely expressed and planned with lamentable shortsightedness.” 100 In a time-pressured, high-stakes situation, however, occasionally charities can hastily solicit more funds than can actually
be used for the intended donor purposes. That scenario describes the circumstances of the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 (“9/11”). 101 No discussion about fungibility of charitable donations
would be complete without visiting this extraordinary circumstance involving fungibility.

96. The American cy pres doctrine mostly focuses on disposition of gifts from charitable trusts
and testaments that lose their ability for fulfillment over time. See generally, RONALD CHESTER ET
AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 433 (3d ed. 2005).
97. This Article does not delve into the thicket of cy pres but discusses its function as a posthoc correction to changed circumstances that play out over a lengthy period of time. For a deeper
exploration, see John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life Cycle, or What Comes Around Goes
Around, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 693, 729 (2007) (“Cy pres [is one of] the primary ‘orthodox’ routes
to dealing with problematic donor restrictions.”).
98. Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 303 n.4 (1939) (first citing
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431 (1935); then citing AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399 (1939)).
99. See Tait, supra note 2, at 1682–84 (stating the passage of time can outmode gift purposes,
like relief help to early settlers of the West and regressive gift restrictions based on race).
100. Comment, supra note 98, at 303.
101. See generally Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to September 11 Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief, 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 252–53 (2003) (providing, in
the wake of 9/11, a thorough analysis of the legal options and restrictions for charities facing an
overfunded scenario).
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In the hours and days after 9/11, uncertainty abounded about the magnitude of loss of life. 102 Though the immediate financial needs for affected
families of victims and first responders were not yet clear, individual and
corporate donors generously opened their checkbooks to help with assistance
through charitable organizations skilled at distributing disaster aid and relief. 103
9/11 provides the ultimate example of how disaster-relief charities have
had to contend with spending excess money earmarked for a uniquely specific purpose. 104 Disaster-relief organizations like the American Red Cross
realized extraordinary fundraising success in the wake of 9/11, raising so
much money in such a short period of time 105 that they had difficulty dispensing it on the narrow terms that many donors intended. 106
In the aftermath of the attacks, some recognized that charities took in
“too much money . . . for too few survivors for typical guidelines to apply.” 107 Some charities that specifically solicited money to support families
of first responders raised money at unexpectedly-high per-family amounts. 108
The charities were caught between honoring the intent of the donors and colliding into tax-exempt-status compliance problems for conferring a “private

102. In the hours after the attacks, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani expressed the overwhelming scale of the tragedy to a global audience. “The number of casualties . . . will be more
than any of us can bear ultimately.” Michael Powell, In 9/11 Chaos, Giuliani Forged a Lasting
Image, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/us/politics/21giuliani.html. A few days later, Mayor Giuliani relayed that nearly 4,000 people in the World Trade
Center complex remained unaccounted for since the collapse, including firefighters. Terence
Neilan, Hopes are Raised and Dashed About Rescue of Firefighters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/nyregion/hopes-are-raised-and-dashed-about-rescue-of-firefighters.html. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, 2,600 people perished at the site. NAT’L
COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 1–2 (2004).
103. See generally THE FOUND. CNT., GIVING IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11: 2003 UPDATE ON
THE FOUNDATION AND CORPORATE RESPONSE (2003). Individual donors gave over sixty percent
of the estimated $2.8 billion in donated 9/11 relief. Id. at 3.
104. See Susan N. Gary, The Problems with Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and
Doing the Right Thing, 85 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 977, 988–92 (2010) (discussing the problems
created by the overwhelming donor response to the American Red Cross and other organizations
for victim-support funds after 9/11).
105. A 2002 study prepared for the Ford Foundation revealed that “[fifty-eight] percent of
Americans had given money to a 9/11-related cause . . . . Two months after 9/11, the largest relief
funds had raised over $1.1 billion . . . the American Red Cross stopped soliciting for its 9/11 Liberty
Fund on October 31, having raised $543 million, by far the largest amount ever contributed in the
aftermath of one disaster.” TOM SEESSEL, THE PHILANTHROPIC RESPONSE TO 9/11, at 1 (2002),
https://www.fordfoundation.org/media/1721/2002-philanthropic_response.pdf. Even after active
fundraising stopped, $424 million rolled in over the next several months. Id.
106. Gary, supra note 104, at 990–92. Given the array of donation channels even to a single
charity, and the range of intent, donor preferences became quite difficult to discern. Id. at 991–92.
107. Victoria B. Bjorklund, Reflections on September 11 Legal Developments, in THE FOUND.
CTR., SEPTEMBER 11: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FIELD OF PHILANTHROPY 18 (2002), http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/911book1.pdf.
108. Katz, supra note 101, at 288–89.
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benefit” on the families. 109 “Given the other sources of aid available to such
families, these charities were indeed challenged to find many intended beneficiaries in long-term financial distress.” 110
Professor Robert Katz extensively examined the 9/11 surplus-donations
problem. 111 He identified three primary possible options that charities have
when confronted with the benefit and logistical curse of a surplus. 112 They
can use the extra resources “for a related charitable purpose,”113 through the
doctrine of cy pres, they can “retain the surplus for another corporate purpose,” 114 or they can “use [the] surplus to enrich the same beneficiaries.” 115
All of these options present means of finding the best match for original
donor intent—intent that donors factored into the implicit price when making
the gift. Of course, returning the donated money would present a perfect
match with implicit price. Effectively, a refund could restore the donor back
to her original position. Such a return may prove impractical to execute,
however. 116 The cy pres related options, including organizational retention
of funds, if implemented with integrity, would use the fungible nature of donor money to honor intent.
When a charity makes a sincere promise, but extraordinary circumstances make that promise difficult to keep, mitigation through a wellmatched substitute use offers a reasonable manner of honoring implicit price.
109. Id. The Internal Revenue Code prohibits nonprofits with tax-exempt status from conferring
private benefits on individuals. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
110. Katz, supra note 101, at 289.
111. See id. at 284–333.
112. Id. at 272–74. Though the focus here is on the perception in the near-term aftermath of the
attacks that the monies raised exceeded need, ironically, the other interesting consideration about
9/11 was the underestimation of long-term effects and trailing needs of certain victim populations.
See generally Kevin McCoy, 9/11 Death and Injury Total Still Rising, USA TODAY (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/09/09/911-death-and-injury-total-still-rising/71943340/; Linda Reinstein, 15 Years After 9/11, The Death Toll Continues To Rise,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/fifteen-years-after-911the-death-toll-continues_us_57d2fb21e4b0273330ac3e3f (discussing the trailing epidemic of 9/11
asbestos-exposure related disease, in light of immediate assurances from the Environment Protection Agency that “the people in lower Manhattan that air monitoring showed ‘the public in these
areas are not being exposed to excessive levels of asbestos or other harmful substances’”). If relief
organizations retained money, the funds possibly could have been used for unanticipated needs that
emerged later.
113. Katz, supra note 101, at 273.
114. Id. at 274.
115. Id.
116. Ironically, also, for reasons of fungibility, it might be difficult to determine which donors
should receive refunds and for which amounts, and challenging to administer repayment to vast
numbers of donors. Accordingly, in the aftermath of their 9/1l controversy, the American Red Cross
recommitted to meet funding commitments and offered refunds only as part of a last resort. See
Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Red Cross; Red Cross Pledges
Entire Terror Fund to Sept. 11 Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/15/nyregion/nation-challenged-red-cross-red-cross-pledges-entire-terror-fundsept-11-victims.html.
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The unanticipated implicit price gap that subsequently emerged can be partially closed. Candor in communications about use of surplus funding after
the fact can also ensure that donors are able to have input and give feedback
that might close the gap even further.
These disaster scenarios provide an important insight into the benefits
of fungible use, and the associated flexibility, if permitted. Though such scenarios should not be conflated with the before-the-fact earmarked charitable
solicitations that I focus on here, they show that charities might still be wise
to leave room to use gifts in a fungible manner. Candor may diminish donor
excitement about being able to contract for specific goods with certainty,
lowering implicit price, but the benefits of flexibility to the charity may be
worthwhile anyway. The 9/11 experience may be exceptional, but it illustrates that point.
Next, in Part II, I discuss some of those deliberate schemes to raise
money through exploitation of fungibility. Even when the charity is legitimate, misdirected earmarked donations deliberately dishonor promises that
factor into the donors’ implicit price.
II. FUNDRAISING CLAIMS AND FUNGIBLE DONATIONS
The fungible nature of donated money becomes a pernicious problem
when charities make representations to use money in a certain way, they actually do use money in that certain way, but money given for that certain way
is used in any way.
Cancer Fund of America demonstrates plain fraud. Donors paid an implicit price for charitable goods and services, but the donations effectively
generated almost no such production. 117 Fungibility-based fraud, where a
charity conceals where gift money really lands, differs in degree of impact
but harms donors and honestly-soliciting charities in a substantially similar
manner.
In the routine fungibility circumstance, the promise made to the donor
appears to have a low implicit price. The actual impact of the gift, however,
is different from the promised impact and may not reflect that low price, as
the charitable institution uses the gift differently. When a charity redirects
money toward another charitable purpose, the level of perceived evil may be
lower, if the money supports some social good rather than illicitly lining the
pockets of the operators. Nonetheless, the charity deprives the donor of the
information necessary to make choices and of the opportunity to act on the
true implicit price. In some quite common cases, the charity’s behavior and
representations rise to the spirit, if not the common-law criteria, of fraud,
misrepresentation, and the like.

117. See supra Section I.B.
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In Section II.A, I review the private law that would address claims that
mislead donors about the ultimate use of fungible donations. From a pragmatic standpoint, donors and regulators would require a high degree of visibility into charitable operations to detect whether a fundraising claim might
rise to the level of a common-law remedy. However, an application of private law focuses on the wrongs at issue. False earmarking promises, though
routine in philanthropic culture, can be construed as paramount to misrepresentation and fraud. Section II.B offers extensive, real examples of problem
scenarios involving fungible spending of earmarked money, including promises to spend money on activities that cannot absorb more funding and diversion of earmarked money to overhead. In Section II.C., I analyze general
examples of public and legal controversy about fungibility of funding, involving charitable or similar purposes. I use these controversies to provide
more glimpses into these opaque funding practices. Finally, in Section II.D,
I show that the current Donor Bill of Rights still leaves room for spending
mischief in the presented examples, driving my proposal in Part III to revise
and strengthen this voluntary commitment.
A. Misrepresentation and Fraud in Charitable Fundraising
These common solicitation practices at issue can meet the elements of
common law fraud and misrepresentation, or come close, under the right set
of conditions. 118 This analysis raises the ethical question about whether charities should behave in this manner, and from a policy perspective, whether
regulators should maintain current levels of apathy toward this fundraising
approach.
For the purposes of understanding how misrepresentation and fraud apply, both technically and in spirit, to this primary context of concern, consider
a basic hypothetical. Acme University, a small, non-profit higher-education
institution, sends a mailer to alumni containing a picture of a student, smiling,
and holding a book. The mailer reads, “Students like Sammy benefit from
scholarships alumni like you have provided. Please fill out the enclosed form
and send a gift to support student scholarships today.” Before the institution
sends the mailer, the University trustees have already met, budgeted, and approved a maximum spending of $500,000 toward student scholarship awards
for the next year.
David, an alumnus who feels grateful for the scholarship he received as
a student at Acme, donates $5,000 toward student scholarships. David does
so in lieu of his regular donation to a local animal shelter. David also donates
twice more than he normally would to Acme because the promised use of the
money especially appeals to him. David would have made a general purposes

118. These practices need not reach the level of common law fraud to inform an understanding
of how they degrade donor decision making.
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gift to Acme, but the concentration of the gift’s promised purpose has lowered the implicit price of the donation, and the increased quantity reflects that
dynamic.
After receiving David’s gift, Acme University’s scholarship spending
remains unchanged from the budget, in part because the planned student
needs have been met. Also, perhaps, Acme determined that the institution
would benefit more from investment in other line items less attractive for gift
solicitation—for example, information-technology upgrades—and decides to
shift the incremental impact of David’s gift there. Acme University could
claim that David’s gift supported or subsidized the $500,000 budget line, but
in reality, David’s gift made no marginal difference to scholarship spending.
The gift supplied $5,000 of fungible resources that could be spent ultimately
on any University need, while not increasing spending on the charitable good
that Acme promised David.
When a charity solicits money by making promises to use the money in
a certain way, without any intent to have that money make the marginal impact promised, donor resources are misallocated, which in a marketplace,
yields inefficient allocations of resources. Acme University, through provision of incomplete information (or misinformation), draws money away from
other charities—and more money than it would with wholly-truthful representations. Further, such practices harm individual donors who seek to realize personal charitable preferences with their personal resources and beyond
that, of course, to maximize personal utility—with charity among many items
of potential consumption. The hypothetical charity, Acme University, lowered the apparent implicit price, presenting donor David with information
that caused him to give money to them, and to give them more of it. David’s
actual charitable consumption now deviates from his preferred levels and avenues of consumption, charitable and otherwise.
A broad review of the elements and doctrine of misrepresentation and
fraud, provided next, contextualizes these fundraising practices. Regulators
can prosecute fraudulent representations under federal and state consumer
protection laws, 119 but individuals also have private remedies associated with
misrepresentation and fraud.
Misrepresentation and fraud have a close relationship, sharing overlapping elements. 120 Misrepresentation, according to the Restatement (Second)
119. For an example of the resolution of a prosecution involving federal and state statutes, see
Stipulation re Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 2, FTC v. Cancer Fund of
America, No. 2:15-cv-00884-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2016) (settling the complaint alleging defendants “engaged in deceptive acts or practices by making false and misleading claims in charitable
solicitations in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act . . . and . . . [in all fifty states and the District
of Columbia], statutes regulating charitable solicitations and prohibiting deceptive and/or unfair
trade practices”).
120. This Article follows the guidance of the Restatement, recognizing that many states have
their own formulations of misrepresentation, fraud, and related causes of action.
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of Contracts, is “an assertion that is not in accord with the facts.” 121 A nondisclosure of a known fact “is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not
exist . . . where [the speaker] knows that disclosure of the fact would correct
a mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is
making the contract.” 122 In the case of Acme University, disclosing the budgetary limitations on scholarships would correct David’s mistaken assumptions. Misrepresentation claims, however, only avail if the misrepresentations are fraudulent or material. 123
An assertion “is fraudulent if the maker intends [it] to induce a party to
manifest his assent and the maker . . . knows or believes that the assertion is
not in accord with the facts.” 124 The strictest form of intent is not required,
however. If the maker merely “does not have the confidence . . . in the truth
of the assertion, or . . . knows that he does not have the basis . . . for the assertion,” the assertion can be fraudulent. 125 A misrepresentation is “material
if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent, or
if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so.” 126
If a donor like David gave money with the expectations of a specific use,
based on representations or the absence of a required correction, the donor
appears able, at the very least, to void the gift on this basis. 127
Turning to fraud, the characterization of injury to the individual donor
becomes at issue. Doubtless, there are distinctions between charitable donations and consumer transactions for goods and services, but the defrauded
charitable donor can experience injury just like the defrauded buyer. Professors, and noted torts scholars, John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok, and
Benjamin C. Zipursky reject the notion that fraud requires “financial loss to
the victim, as well as gain to the defrauder.” 128 They frame fraud more
broadly than as an “‘economic’ tort,”—as “the wrong of interfering with a
particular interest of the victim, namely her interest in making certain kinds
of choices in certain settings free from certain forms of misinformation.” 129
Goldberg and others further suggest that fraud can be better understood
as “[w]hen one person, through a knowing misrepresentation of material fact,
induces another to make a decision in a transactional setting that she would
not have otherwise made, and the decision is to her detriment, whether that
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
122. Id. § 161(b).
123. See id. §§ 159, 162.
124. Id. § 162(1)(a) (emphasis added).
125. Id. § 162(1) (b)–(c) (emphasis added).
126. Id. § 162(2) (emphasis added).
127. See id. § 164 (noting a contract is voidable where one party justifiably relies on the fraudulent or material misrepresentation of another party).
128. John C.P. Goldberg et al., The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1011
(2006).
129. Id.
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detriment is primarily loss of wealth, or some other loss.” 130 Confronting
Acme University’s presentation of fundraising information, David made a
decision he would not otherwise have made. He donated more money than
he otherwise would have, money he would have otherwise donated elsewhere. Certainly, this would constitute “a loss of wealth” emerging from
paying a higher implicit price than calculated, or perhaps “some other loss”
rooted in the failure to have his preferences honored. 131
Though a fraudulent or material misrepresentation can render a contract
voidable, 132 a fraudulent and material representation opens the door to tort
liability. 133 “One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act . . . in reliance
upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused
to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.” 134 If the
speaker merely knows that the representation could be interpreted two different ways, fraud liability could attach.135 Here, if a charity knows a solicitation creates ambiguity concerning the funding’s use, the charity could conceivably confront fraud liability. The Restatement of Torts warns that Acme
University could not reliably hide behind the ambiguity of the scholarship
fundraising message.
Charities walk the line of fraudulent behavior when they use these deliberately misleading fundraising tactics, but pure fraud is not the sole measure of private law for characterizing this activity. Also relevant here are the
torts of negligent misrepresentation and promissory fraud. Negligent misrepresentation appropriates the standard of the “exercise of reasonable care
or competence” in communication of information in the course of business
transactions. 136 Perhaps reasonable care would require Acme University to
communicate with more candor or to represent that the University has
broader discretion to use funds. Of course, such candor would raise the implicit price to donors, just as certain disclosures about consumer goods and
services could cause buyers to recalculate value.

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 1011–12 (emphasis added).
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537–538 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 7, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Punitive damages may avail in circumstances involving particularly egregious behavior. For a discussion of New
York law of misrepresentation, see generally Edward J. Normand, Damages for Deceit: A Case
Study in the Making of American Common Law, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 333, 361–62 (2016)
(“Although [punitive damages] have been refused in . . . ‘ordinary’ fraud . . . case[s], . . . there may
be a recovery of exemplary damages in fraud and deceit actions where the fraud, aimed at the public
generally, is gross and involved high moral culpability.” (quoting Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d
497, 498–99 (N.Y. 1961))).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
135. See id. § 527.
136. Id. § 552.
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The Acme University hypothetical circumstances may also satisfy the
elements of the tort of “promissory fraud.” 137 The Restatement (Third) of
Torts deems a statement as a fraudulent misrepresentation “if the . . . intention to perform a promise . . . does not exist at the time the statement is
made.” 138 As distinguished from contractual breach of performance, “promissory fraud is typically concerned with lying promises, where a party promises to do something but actually has no intention even at the time of making
the promise to do the thing promised.” 139
If Acme promises David that the University will use incremental donations for scholarships with no intent to do so when the promise was made,
Acme may have promissory fraud exposure. Acme could try to cast the solicitation as conveying a promise that the donated money will fund the line
item labeled “scholarships,” but the concept of fungibility renders that notion
a fiction. This, again, assumes that Acme University knows that David’s
donated money is fungible at the time of solicitation. Acme could respond
by claiming that David implicitly understood this concept when he donated
the money and, therefore, there was no intent to breach any promise to David.
In the end, however, David still can contend that Acme had the opportunity
to disclose the complete nature of the intended promise and chose not to do
so. Even if a charity like Acme merely lacks the confidence that money will
be used in the manner represented, and knowingly makes an appropriately
ambiguous representation, donors could pursue voiding the donation or claim
fraud and seek appropriate remedies.
In sum, misrepresentation, fraud, and related common law provide an
avenue for regulators and potential plaintiffs to hold charitable organizations
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 15 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014). Promissory fraud has been recognized as a cause of action in nearly every
jurisdiction. Karen Sandrik, Comment, Overlooked Tool: Promissory Fraud in the Class Action
Context, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 193, 221 (2007).
138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 15 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014). The Third Restatement of Torts generally addresses matters discussed in
Section 530(1) of the Second Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 530(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“Misrepresentation of intention . . . a representation of the maker’s
own intention to do or not to do a particular thing is fraudulent if he does not have that intention.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 15 rep. note a (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014). For a nuanced analysis of concepts invoked by promissory fraud, see
generally IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED
INTENT (2005).
139. Curtis Bridgeman & Karen Sandrik, Bullshit Promises, 76 TENN. L. REV. 379, 387–88
(2009). Elsewhere, Professor Curtis Bridgeman makes the case that courts should encourage parties
with “a huge advantage in bargaining power” to disclose the likelihood of exercising their options
to perform or not to perform. Curtis Bridgeman, Misrepresented Intent in the Context of Unequal
Bargaining Power, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 993, 1010 (2006). In the context of charitable donations, the bargaining power of parties proves challenging to dissect contextually. For example, there
is only one Harvard University competing among other prestigious charities, but there is also only
one Bill Gates competing among prestigious donors. Generally, this Article concerns smaller donors and opaque fundraisers.
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accountable more tightly for promising to put donations to the specific use
promised. Given that charitable organizations have incentives as strong as
their commercial counterparts to induce a donation or transaction, charities
will have similar incentives to make insincere promises to do so effectively
and in volume, assuming that their operators are so motivated.
The most egregious fraud claims become evident from the most blatant
abuses. With Cancer Fund of America, the implicit price of the charitable
donation reflected the donor contracting for specific charitable production. 140
If all was known to the donor, the implicit price might have been infinite,
compared with the low implicit price associated with solicitations producing
legitimate charitable goods and services. The next category of cases presents
a twist of the solicitation representation that proves misleading and fraudulent, even though less seemingly egregious—the case where the charity
knowingly or negligently makes a false promise to the donor about the incremental impact of the donation.
Nonetheless, other considerations avail about whether these practices
truly amount to these common law wrongs, at least in spirit. Perhaps donors
wink at such behavior, knowing that they contribute to a certain cause,
properly pricing in the risk that the resulting incremental charitable production will not precisely match the solicitation. That is, maybe these specificuse solicitations, on the whole, do not withhold material information, they
merely puff out about specific use.
Another consideration would be that donors, per the arguments raised
about motivation of donation, may wish to reap the psychological benefits
from charity, and these imperfect methods of solicitation may maximize
those benefits. 141 Interference with this process might reduce incidence and
quantity of donations, and donors’ utility or enjoyment of gifts. Sometimes,
people do not want to see how the sausage maker makes the sausage or how
the magician performs a trick. They know the knowledge will burden them
and diminish their enjoyment. 142
Nonetheless, Joel Waldfogel’s adjacent work informs that gift-giving
can destroy economic value when information about the recipient’s uses and
needs mismatch the giver’s perception. 143 Courts have frowned upon the
false marketing of placebos, like seller claims that a metal bracelet emits

140. See supra Section I.B.
141. See supra Section I.A.
142. See Christian Turner, The Burden of Knowledge, 43 GA. L. REV. 297, 299 (2009) (“Sometimes we are better off not knowing things . . . . We are happier, indeed better off by many
measures, if ignorant . . . . Despite the advantages knowledge often confers, ignorance is sometimes
preferable because it shields us from unpleasant realities, keeps us from facing difficult choices, or
immunizes us against attack by others.”).
143. See Waldfogel, supra note 46, at 1330.
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pain-relieving rays, even when consumers seem to enjoy the placebo effect. 144 With truthful information, consumer resources might be redirected
toward real solutions or other consumption. Donations that a charity directs
to the wrong place should be treated similarly because better information gets
funds to the right place at the right implicit price.
What is the social cost of requiring truthfulness and more disclosure
with respect to earmarked charitable donations? A fib that directs more
money to the charitable sector, absent the type of misuse in Cancer Fund of
America, may not be the worst kind of fib imaginable. A legitimate charity’s
misdirection of the promised incremental impact of a fungible gift likely does
not equate to a seller’s lie about the medical benefits of a consumer product.
Nonetheless, the fib has an impact worth consideration and assessment. The
social benefits from honest use of incremental money or disclosure appear to
arm donors with more confidence, less perceived risk, and, in theory, overall
lower implicit prices.
B. Earmarked Donations and Fungible Money
In most circumstances, a donor would find it difficult, from a forensic
standpoint, to confirm that a charity used their money to increase incrementally the charitable production solicited. 145 Acme University could report
scholarship spending in a self-produced or other regulatory disclosure and
claim that David’s gift supported the sum that was listed in that segregated
budget account. Acme could claim, somewhat disingenuously, that in the
event of a drastic shortfall, David’s money would commit the University to
spend the minimum level that he had donated.
Perhaps Acme University could try to contend that the budgeted amount
for scholarships does not constitute a solid institutional commitment to spend
the literal, budgeted amount. David’s gift toward scholarships merely helped
to enable the pre-budgeted amount to be met, Acme could claim, or supported
144. See FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 860–62 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing seller claims that
their metal bracelet emits magic “Q-Rays” with pain-relieving power).
145. The publicly-available Internal Revenue Service Form 990 filing provides uniform financial data but with limited utility to the consumer seeking to understand or track donation impact.
“Not only won’t [the Form 990] tell you what a charity does, it won’t tell you where it does it.”
Holden Karnovsky, Don’t Talk to Me About the Form 990, GIVEWELL: THE GIVEWELL BLOG (May
23, 2007), https://blog.givewell.org/2007/05/23/dont-talk-to-me-about-the-form-990/. “The form
was not designed primarily for the use of the general public, but rather as a document to help the
IRS and state charity regulators to ensure that organizations remain true to their charitable purposes,
and that private individuals do not enrich themselves at the expense of those purposes.” Chuck
McLean, Understanding the IRS Form 990, GUIDESTAR: GUIDESTAR BLOG (Oct. 18, 1999, 9:00
AM), https://trust.guidestar.org/understanding-the-irs-form-990. See generally Rosabeth Moss
Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing Well While Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance Measurement in Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-constituency Approach, in PUBLIC
SECTOR MANAGEMENT: THEORY, CRITIQUE AND PRACTICE 220–33 (David McKevitt & Alan Lawton eds., 1994) (describing the challenge of measuring and assessing nonprofit performance generally, even with internally available organizational information).
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scholarships in a symbolic fashion, signaling to the University with a financial vote what the donor community deems important.
The probability of controversies surfacing is lower than one might expect, however, due to the unlikelihood that the donor would detect any dishonoring of intent with the initial solicitation claim. Due to the difficulty of
obtaining and analyzing information, a charity can make claims of this sort
without much worry of discovery, which is why such claims could be made
freely. 146 Some promises about use, however, cannot be fulfilled. With access to the right data and analytical effort, such promises reveal themselves.
1. Solicitation and “Room for More Funding”
Money cannot accomplish everything—that concept has inspired art. In
the words of the Beatles, “Money can’t buy [us] love.” 147 Putting it more
prosaically, not every charity can create additional charitable goods and services with additional donated money. Sometimes, non-financial factors limit
additional charitable production, such as actual need or use for the money.
Earmarked donations might overfund a need.
The charity evaluator, GiveWell, 148 restates the core problem with charitable donations and fungibility of funding:
[J]ust because a donation is formally allocated to a given [specified] program doesn’t mean that the charity is executing more of
that program than it would without the donation. Most charities
have unrestricted funds that they use to supplement restricted
funds; if a charity can’t, or doesn’t wish to, expand a given program, it can often offset your restricted donation with a reallocation

146. Locating examples of undiscovered dishonored solicitation claims or difficult-to-verify
credence claims proves impossible. However, evidence exists in the consumer arena supporting
that bold, difficult-to-verify false advertising claims are made, and occasionally caught. For some
examples of spectacular chutzpah, see FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing
seller claims that their metal bracelet emits magic rays with healing power); Jack Ewing, 10 Monkeys and a Beetle: Inside VW’s Campaign for “Clean Diesel,” N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/world/europe/volkswagen-diesel-emissions-monkeys.html
(describing the full scope of Volkswagen’s false clean diesel claims and associated machinations of
concealment).
147. THE BEATLES, MONEY CAN’T BUY ME LOVE (Capitol Records 1964).
148. GiveWell is described as,
a nonprofit dedicated to finding outstanding giving opportunities and publishing the full
details of . . . analysis to help donors decide where to give. Unlike charity evaluators that
focus solely on financials, assessing administrative or fundraising costs, [it] conduct[s]
in-depth research aiming to determine how much good a given program accomplishes (in
terms of lives saved, lives improved, etc.) per dollar spent.
About GiveWell, GIVEWELL, https://www.givewell.org/about (last visited Apr. 23, 2019).
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of unrestricted funds. That is, restricted funds may be fungible
with unrestricted funds. 149
“[H]ow will the charity’s activities be influenced by additional donations?” 150 This question must be answered to ensure that implicit price for
an earmarked, specified donation is realized. Incremental money cannot always buy specifically-promised incremental charitable production.
With close analysis, fungibility problems can be identified under certain, specific circumstances. A decade ago, GiveWell developed a methodology for measuring whether earmarked donations indeed met their mark,
creating the solicited incremental impact. The methodology asks whether a
charity or a charitable activity has “room for more funding.” 151 The firstorder question appears simple enough: In an environment where a charity
supports multiple programs or carries overhead, “[w]ill more funding lead to
more of the good program(s)?” 152 GiveWell noted in 2011 that it has “seen
next to no helpful discussion of the issue within academia, within the nonprofit sector, or anywhere else.” 153 Perhaps this Article presents a modest
starting point for such a discussion.
GiveWell, as a charity evaluator, does not make any legal conclusions
about the practice of knowingly raising money when there is no room for
more funding. 154 This is unsurprising because nobody has apparently made
any legal objection about this solicitation activity. Arguably, however, if a
charity solicits and accepts the gift knowingly lacking that additional room,
that solicitation could constitute fraud, misrepresentation, and promissory
fraud for reasons described above. 155 Charities might not use a donation in
the directed way for a number of reasons. Producing the designated activity
may be limited by “many factors besides money, such as skilled labor, political support, and appropriate target populations. Thus, more money can’t
necessarily be used to do more of it.” 156
GiveWell offered several real illustrations of charities that solicit earmarked money for causes that are overfunded. For example, GiveWell evaluated the Aravind Eye Care System with high overall praise, as “one of the

149. Room for More Funding, GIVEWELL, https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/criteria/room-for-more-funding (last visited Apr. 23, 2019) (emphasis omitted).
150. Id. (emphasis omitted).
151. Id.
152. Holden Karnovsky, An Essential Question that No One is Asking Charities, GIVEWELL:
THE GIVEWELL BLOG, https://blog.givewell.org/2009/12/15/an-essential-question-that-no-one-isasking-charities/ (last updated Aug. 17, 2011).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra Section II.A.
156. Room for More Funding, supra note 149.
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more impressive humanitarian organizations [they] have seen, performing vision-restoring surgery extremely cost-effectively.” 157 However, Aravind’s
core surgical program, as evaluated in 2012, did not require additional donation funding to support surgeries, as fees already cross-subsidized surgical
expenses for in-need patients. 158 The impact of additional donations proved
unclear to GiveWell, given the success of the surgical program. GiveWell
explained, “Revenue from for-pay surgeries subsidizes free surgeries, and
donations are used on entirely and substantially different programs such as
distribution of spectacles and free food.” 159
GiveWell also offered the similar example of the fundraising tactics of
the Smile Chain charity. Today, Smile Train laudably aims to “change the
world one smile at a time.” 160 This international children’s charity aspires to
“provide[] training, funding, and resources to empower local doctors in 85+
developing countries to provide 100%-free cleft repair surgery and comprehensive cleft care in their own communities.” 161
A decade ago, Smile Train solicited donations with the representation
that a $250 donation could yield one incremental surgery, thus changing a
life. 162 Apparently, this solicitation communicated to Professor Steven
Levitt, author and blogger of Freakonomics, the idea that this promise of incremental impact could be taken literally. 163 Levitt praised Smile Train’s
solicitation strategy accordingly:
Smile Train isn’t just smart about how it delivers the surgeries,
it is smart about how it attracts donors. It covers all of its nonsurgery costs through contributions of its board members. So
every dollar that a donor provides goes directly to surgeries. As a
donor, this feels really good. I like to think about my money going
for surgeries, not office parties. Being able to link a $1,000 donation to four lives changed is a powerful motivator. 164
GiveWell, however, contemporaneous with these solicitations, uncovered that a “shortage of skilled surgeons” prevented Smile Train from putting
all of its earmarked financial resources toward these $250 surgeries.165 The
organization funded as many operations as possible but still maintained a
surplus of funding. Smile Train used this extra money to “engage[] in other
157. Karnovsky, supra note 152.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Our Cause, SMILETRAIN, https://www.smiletrain.org/our-cause (last visited Apr. 23,
2019).
161. Id.
162. Steven D. Levitt, Smile Train, FREAKONOMICS: BLOG (Nov. 8, 2006, 3:38 PM),
http://freakonomics.com/2006/11/08/smile-train/.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Room for More Funding, supra note 149 (emphasis omitted).

2019]

BRINGING CANDOR TO CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS

739

activities” and make grants to seemingly worthy organizations aligned with
the cause. 166 These granted activities, according to GiveWell’s examination
of Smile Train’s Form 990 filings, included travel missions and research.
Though all presumably worthwhile and related to the mission, these activities
were inconsistent with the specific promise of use, certainly as interpreted by
Levitt. 167 The claim that $250 donations created an incremental surgery appeared not to match with the reality, given that the procedures funding had a
surplus.
With a more candid solicitation, Steven Levitt may have attached a
higher implicit price to his donation. If the ability of the charity to produce
the service was limited, any earmarked donation effectively supported a different bundle of services, which included external grants. The implicit price
solicited from donors like Levitt did not factor in the solicitation representation. Though donors may still find satisfaction with the implicit value of their
donation, if all charitable communications carried candor, the donation might
have gone elsewhere. Their donor dollar may have been drawn instead to a
charity that the donors would have valued more.
The “room-for-more-funding” problem evokes common, visible solicitation claims in our culture, like the assessment of claims that you can “save
a child for only fifty cents per day.” 168 Express solicitation representations
that commit to spend money on programmatic uses, as opposed to overhead
uses, also prove powerful to donors, and present their own set of similar fungibility problems.
2. Solicitation and Overhead Spending
In their assessment of implicit price, compelling evidence surfaces that
potential donors value knowing to what degree their funding will cover overhead or operating expenses. 169 One extensive laboratory study “confirm[ed]
that donations decrease when overhead increases, but only when donors pay
for overhead themselves.” 170 Solicitations involving the destination of spe-

166. Holden Karnovsky, Smile Train, GIVEWELL: THE GIVEWELL BLOG, https://blog.givewell.org/2009/11/30/smile-train/ (last updated Dec. 8, 2011).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., UNICEF USA, UNICEF USA: Save a Child for Only 50 Cents a Day, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XozrqJHA-yI (presenting this type of claim
dramatically).
169. See Letter from BBB Wise Giving All. et al. to Donors of America, supra note 19 (revealing that donors “ranked overhead ratio and financial transparency to be more important attributes in
determining their willingness to give to an organization than the demonstrated success of the organization’s programs”). See generally MARK A. HAGER ET AL., NONPROFIT OVERHEAD COST
PROJECT, IND. UNIV., GETTING WHAT WE PAY FOR: LOW OVERHEAD LIMITS NONPROFIT
EFFECTIVENESS (2004) (the study referenced by the BBB).
170. Uri Gneezy et al., Avoiding Overhead Aversion in Charity, 346 SCI. 632, 632 (2014).
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cific-use giving heightens the importance of representations about segregating those donations from overhead spending, and the importance of understanding how to categorize and conceptualize overhead spending.
As discussed below, other donor surveys circumstantially reveal that the
destination of funding for overhead plays a sizable role in donors’ implicit
pricing. Though overhead spending proves difficult to conceptualize and
may not bear on charitable productivity or impact, donors have come to view
the measure as important information, and some cases, the most important
consideration in their donor decision making. 171 Donors do have some sense
of the fungibility potential of their donation, have sensitivity to such claims,
and appear to take them at face value.
From a review of the debate, nothing seems simple about defining and
measuring charitable overhead spending, let alone linking it to charitable effectiveness. One revealing debate emerged concerning the practice of using
overhead-spending financial ratios as a tool for assessing charitable performance. Charity watchdog groups Guidestar, BBB Wise Giving Alliance, and
Charity Navigator united to debunk what they called the “Overhead
Myth.” 172 The Overhead Myth group conceded that monitoring overhead can
play a part in “ensuring charity accountability . . . [a]t the extremes” because
properly interpreted, such excessive overhead spending ratios can expose
fraudulent activities and poor management. 173 However, the Overhead
Mythers warn that “[i]n most cases . . . focusing on overhead without considering other critical dimensions of a charity’s financial and organizational performance does more damage than good.” 174
The Overhead Mythers support their concerns about the misuse and misunderstanding of overhead information with data showing the imprecision
and inaccuracy of overhead ratio measurement. 175 Such imprecision and inaccuracy would make it difficult for donors to use such metrics as reliable
standalone evaluation tools for assessing implicit price. They also cite evidence that overhead spending can enhance organizational performance and
impact and, conversely, that “underinvestment” in overhead can lead to “a
range of negative outcomes which undermine quality [of outcomes] and sustainability.” 176
Despite these problems with the metric, donor interest in overhead
spending remains high. Significant numbers of donors tend to maintain a
belief that charities spend too much on activities in this category. One survey

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See Letter from BBB Wise Giving All. et al. to Donors of America, supra note 19.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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revealed that sixty-two percent of “all Americans believe the typical charity
spends more than it should on overhead.” 177
Yet another watchdog group, CharityWatch, 178 sharply criticized the
Overhead Mythers’s analysis and recommendations. 179 While conceding that
“overly-simplistic overhead ratios or computer-automated ratings” have
“limited value” when not placed in proper context, CharityWatch countered
that “carefully considered” ratios can provide valuable information to donors. 180 However, CharityWatch noted that the overall lack of transparency
into calculation and categorization of overhead activities diminishes the usefulness of overhead analysis. 181
CharityWatch further noted the obvious difficulties in meaningfully
measuring impact against overhead spending. 182 For example, the organization pointed out that the Overhead Myth group defended overhead numbers
because they included mission-critical items like “training, planning and
evaluations.” 183 CharityWatch contended that these numbers do not belong
in the overhead category but rather in the programmatic category that generates and, thus, should not stand as a basis for defending higher overhead ratios. 184 CharityWatch points out that the extreme example can be revelatory.
A donor wishing “to support a charity that makes grants to fund medical research . . . would prefer to donate to a charity that spends 70% of its budget
on research grants and 30% on overhead costs, rather than donate to a charity
that only spends 20% on research grants and 80% on overhead costs.” 185
The Overhead Myth group’s recommendation to charities, expressed in
an open letter, do not necessarily contradict CharityWatch’s general point.
The Overhead Myth group emphasized the importance of assembling meaningful data, improving management systems, and offering transparency. 186
The Overhead Myth group offered three paths to move toward an “[o]verhead
[s]olution.” 187 First, charities should “demonstrate ethical practice and share
[performance] data . . . information about . . . goals, strategies, management

177. Id. (citing Good Charities Spend More on Administration than Less Good Charities Spend,
GIVING EVIDENCE (May 2, 2013), https://giving-evidence.com/2013/05/02/admin-data/.
178. Formerly known as the American Institute for Philanthropy. Give Thoughtfully,
CHARITYWATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/about-charitywatch (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
179. Overhead Ratios are Essential for Informed Giving, CHARITYWATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-articles/overhead-ratios-are-essential-for-informed-giving/133 (last visited Apr. 23, 2019).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Letter from BBB Wise Giving All. et al. to Donors of America, supra note 19.
187. Id.
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systems, and governance processes.” 188 Second, organizations should develop a more rigorous understanding of their true costs and results to “understand[] the cost of achieving their missions,” and do so by “employ[ing] effective performance management systems.” 189 And third, charities should
“educate funders . . . on the real cost of results.” 190 The Overhead Myth
group warns that “highlighting financial ratios as [a] core accomplishment—
especially in . . . fundraising materials . . . can be at the expense of meaningful performance metrics and reinforces [donor] confusion. Funders need to
understand the truth.” 191 In other words, the Overhead Myth group supports
additional candor—a scrupulously ethical approach toward disclosure.
Of course, a charitable organization of any size and scale will need some
degree of infrastructure to support and enable charitable production. The
question is how donors should assess the value of the infrastructure when
they consider implicit price, especially when solicitations leave room for manipulation of spending of earmarked gifts. Given the importance that donors
place on overhead activities, unsurprisingly, charities have responded by
competing for donations on that basis. Just as price point and value prove to
be the top consideration for consumers seeking information when shopping
for cars, 192 donors attach the same levels of importance.
In light of the power of overhead-based solicitations, it is not surprising
to find a few prominent and successful charities making promises not to
spend money on overhead. Given the problems mentioned above, these commitments have raised questions, and received some scrutiny. The aforementioned Smile Train promised donors that solicited donations paid for the delivery of programming, while separate funds paid for overhead expenses. 193
The accuracy of Smile Train’s representation about the way it accounts for
spending stands apart from the general question of whether Smile Train
spends excessively on overhead.194 The first question to address is whether
any definitive statement can truthfully be made about overhead spending,
given fungibility.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. DELOITTE, DRIVING THROUGH THE CONSUMER’S MIND: STEPS IN THE BUYING PROCESS
10 (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documents/manufacturing/in-mfgdtcm-steps-in-the-buying-process-noexp.pdf.
193. Solicitation Train, CHARITYWATCH (Aug. 1, 2010), https://www.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-articles/solicitation-train/40.
194. Assessing the appropriate level of overhead spending proves complex, as discussed infra.
See generally Letter from BBB Wise Giving All. et al. to Donors of America, supra note 19.
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On that basis, the American Institute of Philanthropy (“AIP”) 195 challenged the strength of Smile Train’s representation “that ‘100% of [their] donation goes to program [and] 0% goes to overhead . . . [and] ‘[a]ll non-program expenses, such as overhead and fundraising, are paid for with start-up
grants from [their] Founding Supporters.’” 196 Claiming that a solicitation
will be dedicated 100% to programs and not to overhead cannot “mean that
there are no operating costs affecting the total costs of the program.” 197 In
other words, the sum total of resources could potentially still be spent more
effectively, including earmarked donations, in some circumstances. GiveWell describes this fundraising tactic as a “feel-good gimmick” aimed at
“zooming in on ‘your’ money.” 198 Or, it could be described as an accounting
trick designed to lower the implicit price of the donation by representing a
higher impact of the donation on charitable production. 199
Indeed, corralling a core of loyal supporters to cover overhead enables
charities like Smile Train to claim that incremental money supports only incremental charitable production. 200 However, AIP clarifies that this leaves
out a critical point.201 The overhead expenses may be “covered,” but “overhead expenses will not disappear . . . . [W]hat is spent on one function is not
available for another function.” 202 That is, the overhead money and the incremental solicitations remain fungible, regardless of their label.203 In the
case of Smile Train, “more donations could go toward treating children with
cleft palates if the charity were operating more efficiently, regardless of
whether or not some donors earmarked their donations for overhead.” 204
Robin Hood, New York City’s “largest poverty-fighting organization,” 205 makes similar claims about segregating overhead funds. This organization represents that “Robin Hood’s Board of Directors underwrites all
operating costs, so 100[%] of [individual and other] donation[s] go[] directly

195. AIP changed its name to the more descriptive “CharityWatch,” presumably to lower its
own implicit price for its supporters. See CharityWatch FAQs, CHARITYWATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/about-charitywatch/faq/3113/3115 (last visited May 8, 2019).
196. Solicitation Train, supra note 193.
197. Holden Karnovsky, Robin Hood, Smile Train and the “0% Overhead” Donor Illusion,
GIVEWELL: THE GIVEWELL BLOG (Dec. 7, 2009), https://blog.givewell.org/2009/12/07/robinhood-smile-train-and-the-0-overhead-donor-illusion/.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Solicitation Train, supra note 193.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. ROBIN HOOD, supra note 61, at 2.
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to fighting poverty.” 206 Robin Hood, a high-profile, sophisticated, well-regarded, and well-established organization, 207 leads boldly in marketing efforts with this overhead-related claim, even highlighting it in the very front
of annual reports. 208 The prominence of such a solicitation representation
signals the potential importance of the overhead factor in the implicit price
of donation. Robin Hood wants donors to assign a low implicit price, based
on the notion that donations will not go toward executive salaries, photocopying, or plant-care service at the headquarters, but will go right toward solving the root causes of poverty.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Professor Uri Gneezy and his coauthors conclude from their study of how donors react to overhead that the type of approach used by Robin Hood would help organizations raise money. 209
Though the study does not mention Robin Hood specifically, the authors recommend using “donations from major philanthropists to cover overhead expenses” so that charities can “offer potential donors an overhead-free donation opportunity.” 210
Bold claims about overhead and donations, exemplified by Smile Train
and Robin Hood, evidence the recognized importance to donors of stretching
their finite charitable dollar. For sophisticated and reputable charities to
make such a claim, the inference naturally follows that overhead-usage
claims have a significant impact on implicit price. Organizations believe that
overhead claims will lower implicit price and increase the quantity of donations. Whether these types of promises are kept may prove difficult to track.
Generally, the overhead problem in the charitable solicitation marketplace
could be resolved if charities took it upon themselves to compete more transparently and openly, as the Overhead Myth group recommends. Disclosures
about overhead fungibility might help donors set their implicit prices more
accurately. If truly adhered, such claims, in theory, would help donors sort
out the market, but the potential for manipulation may outweigh any such
benefit.
Alternatively, regulators, recognizing the importance and power of an
overhead-centered solicitation claim, could perhaps establish some baseline
disclosure standardizations. Or, perhaps a group like the Overhead Myth
could repurpose itself to set new best practices rather than serve mostly as a
206. Id.
207. For a colorful depiction of Robin Hood’s image, see Jeryl Brunner, Why Is the Robin Hood
Foundation So Cool?, HUFFPOST (May 18, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeryl-brunner/why-is-the-robin-hood-fou_b_863438.html.
208. See, e.g., ROBIN HOOD, supra note 61, at 2; ROBIN HOOD, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2017)
https://robinhoodorg-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/2018/06/Robin-Hood-Annual-Report-2017.pdf; ROBIN HOOD, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2015), http://2015.robinhood.org/assets/pdf/RH_AR15.pdf.
209. See Gneezy, supra note 170, at 632.
210. See id.
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warning siren. As I later discuss, if the Donor Bill of Rights worked effectively, representations about fund use, including room-for-more-funding and
overhead issues, among others, could be clarified more consistently.
C. Fungible Donation Controversies
Earmarked solicitations and overhead claims present a complex tangle,
but that complexity compounds when a charitable organization fundraises for
multiple purposes and causes. Fungibility problems surface in many different forms. When controversies involving spending emerge, they offer an opportunity for a more detailed and illuminated examination of such dynamics.
They may not prove completely representative of the vast run of problems,
but open disputes and debates provide a useful view.
Analyses of room-for-more-funding and misspending of funding into
legitimate charitable activities prove difficult to find.211 Some solicitation
approaches deftly find a way around the problem. They market earmarked
uses, but then, like Oxfam, expressly, but not prominently, leave open the
possibility of shifting fund use. 212
Large operating institutions like the American Red Cross, Harvard University, and Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center solicit for specific
needs, while also soliciting donations for general needs. 213 Soliciting for general needs among other needs could create the impression that if a donor selects a specific need, the funding would create an incremental impact in that
specific area. These larger charitable organizations may indeed have room
for more funding and engage in budgeting processes that honor earmarked
solicitation through incremental production of charitable goods and services.
However, individual donors may have difficulty verifying incremental production and whether spending budgets for those specific categories had already been preset. Therefore, problems that may lie within their spending
practices would not readily or easily surface; so to understand these issues
practically, controversial instances provide the best view.
As shown below, controversies are worth exploring because they often
lay bare more facts to illuminate the conceptual problems at issue. A few
controversies have emerged from organizations that expressly serve as vehicles for donors or like supporters to choose among beneficiaries. These organizations can confront problems in fulfilling their literal promises, but at
the same time, the extra level of specificity of the earmarked promise raises
donor scrutiny, as these cases reveal.
211. GiveWell appears to provide the only publicly available analyses.
212. See infra Section II.D.
213. Donate Now, AM. RED CROSS, https://www.redcross.org/donate/0218c (last visited Apr.
23, 2019); Giving, MEM’L SLOAN KETTERING CANCER CTR., https://giving.mskcc.org/donate-now
(last visited Apr. 23, 2019); Harvard Online Giving Form, HARV. UNIV., https://community.alumni.harvard.edu/give/16040850 (last visited Apr. 23, 2019).
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1. Solicitation for a Choice of Causes
Recent litigation involving PayPal and the PayPal Charitable Giving
Fund offers a simple, but large-scale, controversy involving alleged misdirection of earmarked charitable funds. 214 The complaint explains why donors
care about the ultimate destination of their earmarked use, and why intended
charities depend on the integrity of those entrusted with ensuring the ultimate
destination. 215 Similarly, the nonprofit organization, Kiva, an entity that enables individuals to help entrepreneurs through global microfinance, was embroiled in an open controversy that illuminated the fundamental challenges
of promoting and then honoring implicit price. 216 In both cases, the allegations suggested that the organizations could have been more candid.
a. PayPal Giving Fund
According to the complaint in a recent class action lawsuit, in 2013,
PayPal, the “open digital payments platform,” 217 established the PayPal Giving Fund, a nonprofit with the mission “to raise funds for charitable purposes
online, primarily in the eBay Inc. and PayPal marketplaces.” 218 PayPal then
partnered with the Giving Fund “to process and disburse donations made
through its giving platform to certain charities.” 219
The PayPal Giving Fund enables donors to match up with charitable
recipients, and then transmit payments to those charities. The PayPal Giving
Fund website told users, “[d]onate to a cause you care about with PayPal.
Choose from over a million charities now.” 220 In essence, PayPal offered to
serve as a clearinghouse between donors and charities, and this service
proved successful, reportedly processing over seven billion dollars in contributions within three years of inception. 221 If this service functioned as advertised, PayPal Giving Fund would enhance the ability of a donor to shop
by implicit price. The allegations here, however, claim that PayPal failed to
fulfill the promise of directing the money to the right place. 222

214. Complaint, Friends for Health v. PayPal, Inc., No. 17-cv-1542 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2017).
215. Id. 14–15.
216. For a contemporaneous account of the Kiva controversy, see Stephanie Strom, Confusion
Over Where the Money Lent via Kiva Goes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/business/global/09kiva.html.
217. Who We Are, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/about (last visited Apr.
23, 2019).
218. Complaint, supra note 214, at 6–7. For the purposes of this Article, I analyze the allegations in the complaint, recognizing that they have not yet been litigated.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 7.
221. Matthew Haag, PayPal Redirects Charitable Contributions Without Consent, Lawsuit
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/technology/paypal-givingfund-lawsuit.html.
222. See generally Complaint, supra note 214.
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The class action lawsuit against PayPal contends that the PayPal Giving
Fund simply did not channel the money to the designated recipients. The
named plaintiffs are one donor who gave through the platform and one charitable recipient who did not receive designated donations. 223 PayPal promised that 100% of donations would go to the charity that the donors selected
through their platform. 224 In some instances, according to the complaint,
PayPal promised to add one percent to each donation made to charities
through the Giving Fund platform. 225
The Giving Fund platform enabled donors to search an extensive database of the charities. 226 If the “charity of choice” did not appear in the database, the donor could invite the charity to join the platform per PayPal’s instruction. 227 When a donor completed a transaction, PayPal Giving Fund
would email an acknowledgement and tax receipts to the donor confirming
the donation to that chosen charity. 228
The plaintiffs alleged, however, that “[w]hile this charitable vehicle
seems straightforward, there [was] a catch.” 229 Donor money will only be
transmitted to chosen charities “if, and only if, those charities have already
set up a business account with PayPal and a separate account with PayPal
Giving Fund.” 230 If the charities did not maintain such accounts, according
to the plaintiffs, “they . . . never receive[d] the donation, despite being listed
on the PayPal Giving website.” 231 Indeed, the lawsuit claims that “hundreds
of thousands” of recipients have not set up the necessary accounts, but PayPal
Giving fund “nonetheless list[ed] those same charities as potential donation
recipients without their knowledge or consent.” 232
Further, the class action complaint alleged that upon receiving a donation, as a general practice, PayPal and the Giving Fund did not notify the
intended recipient about the donation, let alone what they needed to do to
receive it. 233 Despite sending receipts, donors did not receive any notice from
PayPal that a charity could not “receive the funds” and that PayPal Giving
Fund would not give them the donation. 234 If the chosen charitable recipient
did not make arrangements to set up the accounts and then claim the donated
money, after six months, the money would be given “to an organization of
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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[PayPal or the Giving Fund’s] choosing without regard to the intention, beliefs, or desires of the donor.” 235
As the plaintiffs summarized, “[D]onors put their trust in [PayPal and
the PayPal Giving Fund] to deliver their donations, only to have their donations surreptitiously redirected to unknown entities, including those that serve
different causes and different communities than the intended recipient.” 236
b. Kiva
Kiva, a nonprofit organization, seeks out to realize “a world where all
people hold the power to improve their lives” by “creat[ing] connection and
relationships.” 237 Kiva takes pains to distinguish that participants are lenders,
not donors, as this “creates a partnership of mutual dignity.” 238 Through the
Kiva organization, individuals can “lend[] as little as $25 . . . [to] be part of
the solution and make a real difference in someone’s life.” 239
A decade ago, Kiva encountered a public controversy about the mechanics of lending solicitation and whether the earmarked loans flowed directly
into the pockets of the specific borrowers. 240 Despite implications that they
were, many of the posted lending opportunities had already been funded. As
an influential observer explained at the time:
Less than 5% of Kiva loans are disbursed after they are listed and
funded on Kiva’s site. Just today, for example, Kiva listed a loan
[for] Phong Mut in Cambodia and at this writing only $25 of the
needed $800 has been raised. But you needn’t worry about
whether Phong Mut will get the loan because it was disbursed last
month. And if she defaults, you might not hear about it: the intermediating microlender MAXIMA might cover for her in order to
keep its Kiva-listed repayment rate high.
In short, the person-to-person donor-to-borrower connections
created by Kiva are partly fictional. I suspect that most Kiva users
do not realize this. Yet Kiva prides itself on transparency. 241
In sum, Kiva essentially funneled individual lender money to larger “microfinance institutions,” which supported the ultimate recipients.242 After
this controversy emerged in the philanthropy community, Kiva responded by

235. Id. at 4.
236. Id.
237. About Us, KIVA, https://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Apr. 23, 2019).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See generally Strom, supra note 216; David Roodman, Kiva Is Not Quite What It Seems,
CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV., (Oct. 2, 2009), https://www.cgdev.org/blog/kiva-not-quite-what-it-seems.
241. Roodman, supra note 240.
242. Strom, supra note 216.
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bringing more clarity and candor to explaining how the nonprofit functioned. 243
Before, the organization promised that “Kiva lets [people] lend to a specific entrepreneur, empowering them to lift themselves out of poverty.” 244
The representation that people could lend small amounts to specific entrepreneurs, encouraging these lenders to envision that their personal capital would
help a real individual with a specific ambition in a specific place, creates a
low implicit price. A higher implicit price likely results if the lenders envisioned their money pooling with other donations to backstop larger lending
intermediaries. 245 After this public exposure of their model, Kiva’s expressed
promise was watered down to reflect the true implicit price: “Kiva connects
people through lending to alleviate poverty.” 246
These past concerns about Kiva provide a classic example of the fungibility problem. Though not nominally involving directing use of charitable
funds, the spirit of the Kiva model comes close. The narrow representation
of funding use created an artificially low implicit price. Exposure of the
mechanisms behind the operational curtain revealed that lender money
served broader pre-set purposes, thus not technically having the desired incremental impact, illuminating a higher implicit price.
Note that Kiva did not divert money to line the pockets of operators or
other third parties. Kiva used the lower implicit price associated with putting
a face on a donation to raise funding for a larger operation that would ultimately support that face, just not directly. Kiva’s model creates transactions
that lead to social good, if they provide access to capital, good feelings for
lenders, and general awareness about the impact of microfinance. Nonetheless, potential participants have a choice in this market of how to use their
capital for social and other purposes—or even support microfinance. 247 The
more the representations made by the opportunities reflect the true implicit
price, the more likely the funding use meets the desires of the donors and
perhaps finds the most effective place.
2. Freeing up Money for Competing Purposes or Causes
Controversies about fungibility, generally considered, also hide well because those who benefit from the flexibility of fungible use often have a disincentive to disclose their actual use. The next two examples do not focus as
squarely on donor-to-charity charitable donations. They instead show the
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id.
246. Id. A search reveals that Kiva’s website no longer includes this language.
247. Contemporaneous players in this space included Microplace, the Grameen Foundation, and
Acción. See Deanna Chea, Microlending: State Regulatory Reforms to Promote Economic and
Employment Growth in California, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 451, 452–53, 457 (2014).
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nature of conflict that emerges when a specific use is named, but fungibility
enables competing uses.
Fungibility enables money (or action) solicited in the name of one cause
to generate unexpected—and perhaps, undesired—incremental activities.
The clash between a retailer, Meijer, the U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance activist
group, and the Humane Society over the “Foreclosure Pets Fund” crisply illuminated such tensions. 248 Also providing illumination on the concept of
specific-use money enabling the freeing up of funding for other purposes are
state lotteries. Some state lotteries, like North Carolina’s, market ticket sales
as a boost for education funding, when in reality, the ticket revenue boosts
all general-purpose state funding. 249
These two different examples share a common problem. Money attracted for one cause can attract a low, but misleading implicit price, especially when the money goes to competing causes or into completely different
pockets. Again, these controversies may not expose classic donor-to-charity
issues, but they provide a rare glimpse into the dynamics of fund use that
inform the donor-to-charity, implicit price concern.
a. Foreclosure Pets Fund
A conflict between the Michigan-based retailer Meijer and the pro-hunting U.S. Sportsmen Alliance presents a crisp example of the problems associated with charitable donations and fungible use. 250 The Sportsmen Alliance
successfully exposed that Meijer’s promotional support of the Foreclosure
Pets Fund of the Humane Society of the United States indirectly served to
finance the Humane Society’s pursuit of anti-hunting causes. 251 Meijer’s
subsequent discontinuation of the program under pressure from the Alliance,
though disappointing to Humane Society fundraisers, ultimately provided
more visibility to the public into the true impact of a donation to the fund.
During the homeowner foreclosure crisis in 2008, the Humane Society
observed that with foreclosure-driven home evictions and other financial
pressures, “pets . . . turn[] out to be the unexpected victims.” 252 When in dire

248. See generally Meijer Ends Humane Society Contest After Sportsmen Complain, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS (Apr. 28, 2008), http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/2008/04/meijer_ends_contest_after_spor.html.
249. See infra notes 262–263 and accompanying text.
250. See generally Jordan J. Ballor, Fundraising and the Fungibility Phenomenon, ACTON INST.
(Apr. 29, 2008), http://blog.acton.org/archives/2315-fundraising-and-the-fungibility-phenomenon.html.
251. See Meijer Ends Humane Society Contest After Sportsmen Complain, supra note 248.
252. Wayne Pacelle, Money Crunch Claims Pets, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S, A HUMANE
NATION: KITTY BLOCK’S BLOG (Mar. 26, 2008), https://blog.humanesociety.org/2008/03/foreclosure-pet.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
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financial straits, people may save money by “sacrificing pet care or by relinquishing or even abandoning their pets.” 253 In response, the Humane Society
set up the Foreclosure Pets Fund as a fundraising vehicle “to provide grants
to shelters, rescue/adoption groups, and animal care and control agencies to
assist families in caring for their pets.” 254 Retailer Meijer took the opportunity to support the Foreclosure Pets Fund with a modest promotion involving donations of “$1, up to $5,000, for every entry in an online pet photo
contest.” 255
Though a $5,000 donation to an organization receiving over $112 million in grants seems insignificant,256 the fact that this donation could spill
over into supporting causes that the Sportsmen Alliance sharply opposed
proved symbolically important enough to raise the organization’s ire. Put
differently, the Alliance pointed out to the public that Meijer’s support of the
Foreclosure Pets Fund would not reflect the implicit price, as each incremental dollar given by a donor could generate a dollar’s worth of charitable activities the donor ideologically opposes, not the cause they thought they were
supporting.
The Alliance’s scrutiny exposed a dynamic that may have misled Meijer
shoppers on a small scale, many of whom purchased hunting equipment and
licenses there. 257 Up front, when establishing the Foreclosure Pets Fund, the
Humane Society expressly linked the foreclosure crisis to the broader fate of
animals and humankind, an idea that might have raised suspicion about the
ultimate impact of supporting the fund. As the Humane Society explained:
We at The [Humane Society of the United States] have long argued that there’s a link between the fortunes of animals and other
pressing social issues. When someone abuses an animal, for instance, it is often a precursor to other forms of violence to come.
Or if a downer cow is abused and funneled into the food supply,
there is a greater threat to public health.
Well, the issue cuts in many ways. When people are in economic
distress, or facing a financial loss, that often has repercussions for
animals. Human and animal lives are entangled in our culture, and
when there is crisis that affects one or the other, there’s usually an
impact to be felt elsewhere. 258

253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Meijer Ends Humane Society Contest After Sportsmen Complain, supra note 248.
256. See Humane Soc’y of the U.S., IRS Form 990, Return of the Organization Exempt from
Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2016).
257. See Meijer Ends Humane Society Contest After Sportsmen Complain, supra note 248.
258. Pacelle, supra note 252.
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In introducing the context for the program, the Humane Society hinted
at the systemic impact of the foreclosure program on the broader organizational mission. Certainly, the specified use for the raised money proved attractive to certain types of donors, but the implicit price, if one takes the donation at face value, like a Meijer customer might, would reflect the narrower
promoted cause.
In the end, the Humane Society effectively validated the Sportsmen Alliance fungibility concerns in their sharp response to Meijer’s pressured abandonment of the foreclosure fund. In the wake of Meijer’s withdrawal, the
Humane Society did not deny fungibility. To the contrary, the organization
embraced fungibility and the systemic impact of an earmarked donation:
Yesterday, I issued a call to raise $10,000 after the radical U.S.
Sportsmen’s Alliance (USSA), in a despicable move, intimidated
Meijer department stores into dropping its support of a fund we
created to help keep pets with their families during home foreclosures. Already, supporters have donated more than $25,000—and
counting—to help the pet victims of the foreclosure crisis and to
save wildlife from horrible abuses such as captive shoots and polar
bear trophy hunting . . . . I will soon send a letter to the Sportsmen’s Alliance and let them know that they’ve helped us raise
money for pets and for fighting canned hunts and the other inhumane and unsporting practices that are the group’s favored activities. 259
Though the Meijer case study involved a charitable promotion, and not
a straight individual charitable donation, it presents a live example about solicitation representations that imply earmarking of funds that in the end, the
charity admits are for fungible use. In this instance, the organization is not
shifting the funding to overhead or closely-related causes, but to causes laden
with entirely different values—for the constituents of the Sportsmen’s Alliance, at least.
The Meijer customer may go to the effort of participating in the promotion with an implicit price set around the concept of helping families and pets
stay together. If the Meijer customer knew that participation in the promotion
also supported other Humane Society causes, the implicit price would differ.
For the Meijer customer, the realization of the true implicit price for assisting
families and pets might require different efforts, like direct donation of dog
food to shelters. Though the political motivations magnified perhaps a
broader conflict between two competing organizations, fungible use for
causes other than the one earmarked sparked the conflagration, despite the
almost negligible amount of funding at issue.
259. Wayne Pacelle, We Did It, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S, A HUMANE NATION: KITTY
BLOCK’S BLOG (May 7, 2008), https://blog.humanesociety.org/2008/05/meijer-ussa2.html (emphasis added).
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b. State Lotteries and Funding of Specific Public Services
State lotteries, though clearly distinct from charities, market a public dogood element as part of their appeal to lawmakers and ticket buyers, in addition to selling the opportunity to achieve instant fortune. Like many charitable solicitations, this form of marketing raises questionable specific-use
claims about their actual impact on state budgets. Lotteries make public marketing claims that revenue surpluses from their operations “fund state-run
programs such as education, parks, emergency responders, veterans’ health
and other services.” 260 In effect, these claims lower the implicit price of this
form of gambling by assuring that losses will be allocated to a good cause.
Public uses of this money that deviate from such causes create an implicit
price gap. As discussed, the political justification for, but also the marketing
of lotteries promotes such uses, so the power of the advertising representation
about fund use must be weighed.
In part, the fungibility of funding enables public lottery operators and
state legislatures to undermine the specific-use representations made to lottery customers and sponsors. The fungibility question here has achieved a
higher public profile as public spending data proves more accessible than
private charitable spending. 261
One example helps illustrate the fungibility problem with respect to surplus money. North Carolina calls its state lottery the “North Carolina Education Lottery.” 262 The North Carolina Education Lottery makes quite specific representations to ticket purchasers and the general public about the

260. David Goldman, Does Powerball Really Fund Education?, CNN MONEY (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/13/news/powerball-education/index.html.
261. See, e.g., Sonali Kohli & Joy Resmovits, The Problem with Your Lottery Tickets and School
Funding, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-lotteryschools-20160126-story.html (questioning the equity of lottery fund educational redistribution and
quoting a lottery official: “[I]f people are motivated to support their schools they’ll just support their
schools directly.”); Valerie Strauss, Mega Millions: Do Lotteries Really Benefit Public Schools?,
WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2012) (“State lotteries . . . were sold to the public as enterprises that would
benefit schools with millions of dollars . . . . [H]as public education really received a windfall? . . .
[A] lot of money goes to public schools from the lotteries. But . . . the money doesn’t do what it
was promised it would by any means.”); Elizabeth Chuck, Powerball Windfall? Schools Don’t Always Benefit From Lottery Sales, NBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/powerball-windfall-schools-don-t-always-benefit-lottery-sales-n494746 (“State legislatures
often use the millions of dollars that come in from the lottery as an opportunity to reallocate other
funds intended for schools from the state’s general revenue, making the overall education budget
barely higher than it was before lottery money was added.”).
262. See N.C. EDUC. LOTTERY, https://www.nclottery.com/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2019); see also
Goldman, supra note 260.
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impact of lottery surplus money on state education services and infrastructure, 263 embedded in the claim that all surplus proceeds go to the state education budget. 264 The incremental impact of the lottery on education, however,
remains in question.
When the North Carolina General Assembly established the state lottery, the initial bill from the North Carolina House of Representatives addressed concerns about fungibility head on. The bill first maintained that
“net revenues generated by the lottery shall not supplant revenues already
expended or projected to be expended for those public purposes, and lottery
net revenues shall supplement rather than be used as substitute funds for the
total amount of money allocated for those public purposes.” 265 This language
intended to set a budgeting rule that lottery revenue would be added to the
established education budget. However, the North Carolina State Senate
struck that language from the bill. 266
Presumably, this change enabled North Carolina to have a freer hand in
the budgeting process, but even if the Senate kept the House language, assessment of the incremental impact of lottery revenue on education spending
would prove difficult to discern in the long run. If a lottery windfall financed
the construction of new schools, certainly, the legislature would factor the
existence of those schools into their total appropriations for school construction from general funds. The North Carolina Education Lottery can make
claims to ticket buyers and the public that the money goes toward education,
but factoring in whether the revenue causes incremental spending proves
more difficult.
The above illustrations show how fungibility can enable solicited money
to be used for radically different purposes. Ultimately, fungibility leaves
room for sophisticated charitable marketers to attract donors through the lure
of a low implicit price, followed by language presented elsewhere that enables them to disclose the true use. Or, the opacity and complexity of the
larger organization simply provides more of a shield. Such dynamics lead
donors to misprice their charity, as noted, donating it to the lower-priced
charity at the expense of other more candid charitable causes and uses. A
solution to this problem can come from within, through stricter self-regulation of candor in charitable representations. Failing a private solution, it can
come from regulators. Self-regulation, through a governing mechanism like
263. This lottery claims to fund free pre-kindergarten to a specific number of children, support
school construction, and provide higher-education scholarships, among other public education
needs. See Winning for Education, N.C. EDUC. LOTTERY, https://www.nclottery.com/Education
(last visited Apr. 23, 2019).
264. See Goldman, supra note 260.
265. H.R. 1023, 2005 Gen Assemb., 2005 Sess. § 18C-102 (N.C. 2005); see Goldman, supra
note 260.
266. S. 622, 2005 Gen. Assemb., 2005 Sess. § 31.1(b) (N.C. 2005) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18 C-102 (2015)); see Goldman, supra note 260.
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a revised Donor Bill of Rights might prove more appealing because formal
compliance and enforcement will put an expensive, larger burden on charitable production.
D. “A Donor Bill of Rights”
Some charitable organizations have recognized that confidence in donation use effectively lowers the implicit price of donation. As such, several
organizations agreed to pledge their compliance with “A Donor Bill of
Rights,” created by several fundraising and philanthropy associations. 267
Among other commitments, those who pledge to honor the Donor Bill of
Rights, agree “to . . . inform[] [donors] of the organization’s mission, of the
way the organization intends to use donated resources, and of its capacity to
use donations effectively for their intended purposes . . . [and] [t]o . . . assure[] their gifts will be used for the purposes for which they were given.” 268
A charitable organization can still promote a specific use of funding
without formally committing to such use, yet still able to comply with a commitment to honor the Donor Bill of Rights. For example, Oxfam self-describes as “a global organization working to end the injustice of poverty[,] . . .
help[ing] people build better futures for themselves, hold[ing] the powerful
accountable, and sav[ing] lives in disasters.” 269 Oxfam’s donation page presents rotating examples of specific uses for gift money, much like the way
Smile Train presented impact for a price. 270 Oxfam presents these specific
uses prominently, but uses careful language in so doing. For example, the
organization claims that a specific donation of X dollars “can provide,” “educate,” or “help” address the identified problems, which leaves Oxfam more
flexibility for ultimate use than the language of “will provide” or “shall provide.” 271 A click on any of Oxfam’s specific uses leads to the same donationcapture page, briefly presenting an image of a man, presumably a potential
beneficiary, with the general message:

267. See DONOR BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 26. The organizations who created this code were
“the Association of Fundraising Professionals (AFP), the Association for Healthcare Philanthropy
(AHP), the Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE), and the Giving Institute:
Leading Consultants to Non-Profits.” The Donor Bill of Rights, AFP, https://afpglobal.org/donorbill-rights (last visited Apr. 29, 2019) (emphasis omitted). Among others, prominent charity Oxfam
claims endorsement of the Bill, along with “the Independent Sector, the National Catholic Development Conference, the National Committee on Planned Giving, the National Council for Resource
Development, and the United Way of America.” See Donor Bill of Rights, OXFAM AM.,
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/donate/help/donor-bill-of-rights/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
268. DONOR BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 26.
269. See About Oxfam, OXFAM AM., https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/about-oxfam/ (last
visited Apr. 29, 2019).
270. See Donate, OXFAM AM., https://www.oxfamamerica.org/donate/ (last visited Apr. 23,
2019).
271. See id. (emphasis added).
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Now, more than ever, your support matters. Millions of families
are struggling to overcome hunger, poverty, and injustice. You can
support survivors of the devastating disasters in Indonesia, aid
Rohingya families and others displaced by violence, assist families
on the brink of famine in Yemen, and help people work their way
out of poverty. 272
Oxfam also promotes its subscription to the Donor Bill of Rights, which
“assure[s] [that] gifts will be used for the purposes for which they were
given,” 273 and the mechanisms and language certainly leave room for use for
the general purposes listed on the donation capture page. This general language stands apart from specific uses that the user clicked upon to reach the
capture page. Oxfam appears to comply with the letter of the Donor Bill of
Rights while retaining discretion about funding allocation. Oxfam’s web donation process invokes and leverages the appeal of specific uses but leaves
the ultimate funding use to the discretion of the organization. In other words,
Oxfam deploys specific-use-like tactics to lure in funds but makes no firm
commitments. A standard of full candor might require Oxfam to be more up
front about trying to raise a general pool of money for distribution at their
expert discretion.
The World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”) 274 uses solicitation tactics similar
to that of Oxfam, but the representations about incremental impact are somewhat softer and less specific (that is, no dollar donation amounts linked to
specific impact) and disclosure about fungible ultimate use emerges more
clearly on their website. 275 The WWF centers web solicitations on donor
“[a]doptions” of animals, for which they offer a vivid array of available exotic species. 276 This tactic makes the donation impact a bit more tangible, as
the donor can click on one of dozens of attractive pictures of specific animals
for adoption. However, the WWF, in contrast to Oxfam, conspicuously represents that the adoptions are “symbolic” only. They are indeed called “Symbolic Species Adoptions,” 277 and the adoptions are without specific impact
on any animal, or even any particular species. WWF discloses, albeit less
vividly and conspicuously than the heartrending pictures of the creatures up

272. See Donate Now, Save a Life, OXFAM AM., https://secure2.oxfamamerica.org/page/contribute/main_donate_new?donation_level=100&s_src=onetime (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
273. See Donor Bill of Rights, OXFAM AM., https://www.oxfamamerica.org/donate/help/donorbill-of-rights/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2019).
274. WWF’s “mission is to conserve nature and reduce the most pressing threats to the diversity
of life on Earth.” They focus their work on food, climate, fresh water, wildlife, forests, and oceans.
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, https://www.worldwildlife.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
275. See generally WWF Gifts, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, https://gifts.worldwildlife.org/giftcenter/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
276. Symbolic Species Adoptions, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, https://gifts.worldwildlife.org/giftcenter/gifts/Species-Adoptions.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
277. Id. (emphasis added).
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for adoption, that “[y]our donation provides general support to World Wildlife Fund, a 501(c)(3) charitable organization. [Eighty-four] percent of
WWF’s spending is directed to worldwide conservation activities.” 278
Charitable appeals, expressly promoting earmarked use, while also expressly disclaiming the earmark restriction, echo other areas of consumer
marketing practices. Regulation of consumer claims presented alongside
simultaneous disclaimers varies by context. For example, under FTC guidelines, a seller can lawfully declare an item “free,” as long as the terms, conditions, and obligations required for the consumer to realize the “free” price
are disclosed. 279 Such a rule provides permission for a seller to make a contradictory claim, perhaps a claim more contradictory than the charitable representations. On the other hand, the drafters of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 280 set out to attack contradictory language about simultaneous seller
warranty claims and disclaimers. 281 In drafting Magnuson-Moss, the House
Committee reported concern that “in many cases where a warranty or guarantee was ostensibly given the old saying applied ‘The bold print giveth and
the fine print taketh away.’” 282 As noted above in the description of the
Oxfam website, the Oxfam lead-in induces the donor with a narrow solicitation claim, but the subsequent disclosure upon click-through “taketh away”
the implied spending restrictions.283
FTC guidance on the use of the word “free” permits a degree of express
seller contradiction, and if the charitable solicitation norms leaned that way,
both the Oxfam and the WWF representations would pass the test. Magnuson-Moss, however, attacks and rejects such contradiction with warranties

278. Id. The charity Save the Children employs the adoption mechanism in a similar fashion to
WWF, using children instead. Up front, Save the Children promotes sponsorship of individual,
named children in need of support for nutrition, health, development, and education, but discloses
elsewhere that the money will not go directly to that particular, named child. See Frequently Asked
THE
CHILDREN,
Questions
About
Child
Sponsorship,
SAVE
https://www.savethechildren.org/us/sponsor-a-child/sponsorship-faqs (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
Save the Children states:
When you become a sponsor, Save the Children does not give your donation directly to
your sponsored child, rather we combine your monthly support with the support of other
sponsors to help support projects in your sponsored child’s community—creating a “ripple effect” of positive change throughout the entire sponsorship community.
Id.
279. Commission Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations, 16
C.F.R. § 251.1(c) (2018); David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49,
53–56 (2008).
280. Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012)).
281. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702,
7706.
282. See id. at 24.
283. See supra notes 271–273 and accompanying text.
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for consumer goods. Claims of earmarked use, when coupled with a disclaimer, would likely find disfavor under the spirit of the Magnuson-Moss
approach.
The Magnuson-Moss approach appears to fit the charitable-solicitation
problem better than the free approach. With the free pricing regime, the consumer, though put at some risk of confusion, has an opportunity to tally and
verify the total price before completing the transaction. Warranties, in comparison, in practice, reveal more of their content in the future and unlike price,
the consumer may not confront the warranty’s meaning at the point of transaction. Therefore, the opacity associated with the use of earmarked funds
may closely resemble warranties for consumer goods, thus the standard for
charitable solicitations should lean more toward the spirit of the concerns that
led to the enactment of Magnuson-Moss. Deception should be construed
more broadly for difficult-to-verify claims about specific use.
In sum, WWF exemplifies an attempt to lower implicit price by making
potential uses more vivid—evoking notions of specific use but simultaneously clarifying that donations can be used for “general support” of the organization. 284 Oxfam apparently attempts to lower implicit price by presenting specific uses and showing the incremental impacts of dollar amounts to
specific uses, in the manner of Smile Train. 285 Ultimately, an accurate implicit price should reflect the broad discretion that Oxfam retains to spend
donations on the worthy specific causes promoted by the charity. In both
cases, enhanced candor in charitable communications would help donors
make informed assessments of impact.
Though deficient, the current approach toward self-regulation of charitable-solicitation representations contains the seeds of realistic proposals for
reform of these practices. Next, I discuss how a revised Donor Bill of Rights
could be the centerpiece of an initial effort to bring candor to charitable communications.
III. PROPOSALS FOR CHARITABLE SOLICITATION REFORM
Bringing candor to the solicitation process when funding is fungible can
help all honest charitable causes, while enhancing donor confidence in charities. Requirements of more disclosure would change the way organizations
solicit money and might shape how organizations use money. However those
changes pan out, the incremental impact of a donor’s gift will more closely
reflect the donor’s intentions.
The need for extra candor in charitable solicitation representations, particularly where fungibility surfaces as an issue, results from the difficulty of
market correction of the claim, which I explain in Section III.A. In Section
284. WWF Gifts, supra note 275.
285. See supra Section II.B.1.
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III.B, I suggest an addition to the Donor Bill of Rights: a more robust commitment of candor in solicitations and communications, to ensure that specific-cause solicitations meet or exceed donor expectations for use. Self-policing of communications, with the assistance of philanthropy watchdog
groups, will ensure that money finds the channel that donors expect. Finally,
Section III.C prescribes a last resort path for regulatory intervention. The
costs of regulatory compliance alone make this option less attractive, but the
prospect, along with risks of civil liability and public-relations exposure,
should incentivize the sector to embrace the “candor commitment.”
A. Enhancing the Integrity of Fungible Solicitation Claims
Though the approach taken here focuses on the concept of implicit pricing, charitable solicitation claims usually frame a promised impact. That
promised impact can be general, like a no-strings-attached donation to a university. That promised impact can be specific, as in “twenty dollars can feed
this particular child in a particular remote village for one week.” Consumers
have difficulty sorting out these claims in the same way they have trouble
sorting out claims about the need for auto repairs, claims about a product’s
environmental impact, or pain relief from wearing a bracelet.286 All of these
claims prove expensive to verify relative to the price of the purchase.
These types of advertising claims exemplify “credence claims,” often
the types of claims that concern regulators the most. 287 Advertising claims
can be characterized as falling into three categories—search, experience, and
credence—with each raising different levels of concern about whether consumer markets can correct them without intervention.288
Search claims involve seller claims about price, category of item, and
availability. 289 In the charitable context, a search claim might be, “We are a
nonprofit higher-education charity.” These claims prove comparatively inexpensive for a donor to verify in advance of a gift, should the donor so
choose. 290 Experience claims involve claims about quality that can be verified after a transaction. 291 In the charitable context, an experience claim
might be, “Your donation will pay for a late-applying child named Taylor to
attend a private academy for free, even though the academy has never seated
more than twenty students.” The donor can verify after the gift whether that
student named Taylor enrolled for free as the twenty-first student. 292

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See Friedman, supra note 24, at 847–51.
Id. at 859.
See id. at 853–58.
Id. at 843.
See id.
See generally id. at 844–47.
See generally id. at 862–63 (discussing consumer verification of experience claims).
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Credence claims, however, encompass most of the potential claims that
charities make where resources are fungible and verification proves expensive. In the world of consumer protection enforcement, credence claims often take enforcement priority. 293 Consumers find credence claims challenging to test, as they never openly indicate that they were unfulfilled.294
Therefore, consumers will not adjust behavior based on false credence
claims, meaning that markets alone are not well-situated to punish those sorts
of claims as swiftly. False credence claims can prevail over more honest
claims. 295 The same applies for charitable markets, where the element of
trust in charities and the faith in their regulatory oversight may be higher.
Though an argument has been made that rational advertisers would never invest in credence claims because consumers would not attach value to unverifiable information, empirical evidence indicates that they proliferate. 296
Smaller individual donations, in particular, are of concern in this dynamic because the cost of investigation rapidly exceeds the potential value of
the gift. Larger solicited donations might instigate the donor to investigate
or at least indicate that the donor has resources and ability to inspect. A university donor endowing a five-million-dollar chaired professorship in computer science may have the resources to investigate and extract necessary
guarantees about incremental impact. A twenty-five-dollar donor to a university for scholarship funding, on the other hand, must take it on faith that
the donation will have an incremental effect, or simply discount the representation.
Charities that solicit honestly and with full candor may carry a higher
implicit price than those credibly generating the same charitable production
with less candor and more persuasive tricks in their solicitation. The nature
of credence claims indicates that nobody will check them, and they will not
self-correct. In order for a charity to compete for the donation dollar, a charity will have to cut corners in their solicitations the same way that their competitors might. If leading charities cut corners, less sophisticated charities
will have fewer choices.
Therefore, the first step that leading charities can make, along with guidance, credentialing, and monitoring from leading philanthropy watchdogs,
would be to strengthen their obligations of candor. The current Donor Bill
of Rights offers a framework that can support a renewed commitment by
charities to either honor their representations about incremental impact or to
represent how they handle their money with full candor.
293. A content analysis revealed that the FTC focuses enforcement on credence claims and hybrid experience-credence claims. Id. at 859.
294. See id. at 847–48 (using the example of the claim that an automobile owner needs a coolant
flush—how does the lay consumer verify such a claim?).
295. See id. at 847–49.
296. See id. at 864 (recapping the debate between Professors Lillian BeVier and Roger
Schechter).
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B. Adding Candor Commitments to the Donor Bill of Rights
The Donor Bill of Rights, written by fundraising-professional organizations in 1993 297 and adopted by a range of prominent nonprofits, 298 provides
a ready framework for clarifying the rules and establishing new norms about
fundraising practices. Although the Association of Fundraising Professionals
incorporated electronic-focused additions in an “e-donor Bill of Rights,” 299
some nonprofit sector leaders have observed that after twenty-five years, the
Donor Bill of Rights may be ripe again for revision and amendment. 300
The preamble of the Donor Bill of Rights enables charities to adopt a
view of philanthropy that honors donor intent and recognizes the important
of donor “confidence”:
Philanthropy is based on voluntary action for the common good. It
is a tradition of giving and sharing that is primary to the quality of
life. To assure that philanthropy merits the respect and trust of the
general public, and that donors and prospective donors can have
full confidence in the not-for-profit organizations and causes they
are asked to support, we declare that all donors have these
rights . . . . 301
The ten articles of the Donor Bill of Rights generally focus on donor
ability to “[t]o be informed” about and “[t]o have access” to the charity. 302
Articles I and IV, particularly, offer general, broad commitments about the
information rights related to the use of donations. Through adoption, signatories agree that donors have the right “[t]o be informed of . . . the way the
organization intends to use donated resources, and of its capacity to use donations effectively for their intended purposes.” 303 Note that room-for-more-

297. See DONOR BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 26.
298. In the absence of an available census, a Google search shows that a prolific variety of
nonprofit organizations claim to have signed on to the document, ranging from educational and
health care institutions to advocacy groups. See, e.g., Donor Bill of Rights, CARNEGIE MELLON
UNIV., https://www.cmu.edu/engage/about-us/donor-bor.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2019); Donor
Bill of Rights, CHILDREN’S ORGAN TRANSPLANT ASS’N, http://cota.org/give/donor-bill-of-rights/
(last visited Apr. 29, 2019); The NRA Foundation, Inc. Resolution Adopting a Donor Bill of Rights,
NRA FOUND., https://www.nrafoundation.org/a-donor-bill-of-rights/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
299. See Principles of the Donor Bill of Rights, ASS’N OF FUNDRAISING PROF’L,
https://afpglobal.org/principles-edonor-bill-rights (last visited Apr. 23, 2019) (addressing the issues
regarding electronic solicitation and communication that emerged since 1993).
300. See, e.g., Pamela Barden, Is It Time to Reassess Donor’s Rights?, NONPROFITPRO (Mar.
9. 2017), http://www.nonprofitpro.com/post/time-reassess-donors-rights/; Bruce Deboskey, On
Philanthropy: Rethinking and Revising the “Donor Bill of Rights,” DENVER POST (Jan. 16, 2017),
https://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/11/on-philanthropy-donor-bill-of-rights-bruce-deboskey/
(observing both sectors offer proposals for updating and reforming the statement).
301. DONOR BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 26.
302. Id.
303. Id.

762

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:709

funding issues have already been acknowledged by the prominent fundraising groups.
Further, the Donor Bill of Rights maintains that donors are “[t]o be assured their gifts will be used for the purposes for which they were given.” 304
This latter question raises, albeit obliquely, the question of disclosures about
fungible use of money and whether the charity will use a donation to truly
produce the expected incremental production reflected in the implicit price.
If philanthropy watchdogs reopen the Donor Bill of Rights, they should
first consider whether certain solicitation practices with respect to fungibility
remain consistent with the spirit of the Donor Bill of Rights as written. The
Donor Bill of Rights leaves open wiggle room for charities to define what
“capacity” means, for example. Did Smile Train properly represent “capacity
to use donations effectively”? Smile Train could respond that spending on
like causes other than surgery would be an effective use.
Also, the word “purposes” could be construed broadly. As noted in detail throughout this Article, an organization can use fungibility as a means for
claiming that donated money flowed to its purposes, if the organization eschews incremental impact as the measurement. Of course, vagueness, combined with voluntary compliance, weak self-enforcement, and little monitoring enables organizations to take liberties where they might want to do so.
After all, the benefits of seeking to present a lower implicit price prove powerful, and the pledge offers loopholes.
The vague pledges to inform, provide access to, and reassure donors
about fund use would bare more teeth if associated with an independent,
stronger, affirmative commitment to full candor by recipients. Charities
could pledge to achieve a new level of honesty. Such an example exists in
the obligations that some states have put onto higher education institutions in
their communications with students and the public.
These standards from higher-education regulation could inform reformation of charitable solicitation. Buying into an expensive education program that promotes effectiveness in achieving student goals requires that institutions use the utmost care in providing information to prospective
students. One state offers language that could prove useful for incorporation
in an additional article to the Donor Bill of Rights. In Oregon, in order to
obtain authorization to grant educational degrees, “[a] school shall be scrupulously ethical in all communication with the public and with prospective
students. School publications, advertisements, and statements shall be
wholly accurate and in no way misleading.” 305

304. Id.
305. OR. ADMIN. R. 583-030-0035(12) (2015). Oregon appears to stand out as fairly demanding
with educational institutions with this requirement, but, nonetheless, this language is offered only
as inspiration for part of a voluntary pledge, not as a formal law reform proposal.
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Philanthropy groups should add something similar to the Donor Bill of
Rights to reinforce the existing articles, which have already been long accepted, in principle: “A not-for profit organization shall be scrupulously ethical in all communication with the public and with prospective donors. Organization publications, advertisements, and statements shall be wholly
accurate and in no way misleading.”
This additional clause would require complete candor from charities
about their use of funding—the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth. “Scrupulously ethical” behavior is warranted from entities that receive
preferential status in the tax code, and from those who solicit money to serve
a public interest. Ethical behavior alone might imply that a charity could be
passive about eradicating any confusion. Scrupulously ethical behavior, as
this one Oregon rule requires, calls for more affirmative efforts to ensure that
donors are completely informed.
Organizations adopting and complying with a revised Donor Bill of
Rights would have to communicate fungible use discretion, the true incremental impact of a gift, and whether the represented activities have room for
more funding. Essentially, a charity would have an affirmative obligation to
disclose with clarity how donations would be used. One would expect that
this might change the nature of solicitation, or it might change the nature of
use. The lead-ins with specific promises about use, followed by subsequent
language that qualifies the promise as not carrying any commitment, would
prove more difficult to make under this guideline. Perhaps the most inexpensive way to comply with a candor clause would be to declare conspicuously
that the organization will put the money to best determined charitable use,
consistent with the mission—without any confusing additional noise.
Openness should not impose significantly higher compliance costs, but
it might make lowering the implicit price of donations more challenging.
Generally, some empirical studies show that restricting advertising information raises consumer prices, 306 but this proposal aims to increase information, so the net impact on implicit pricing for charities may not be as clear.
The perceived risks of charities misspending donated money should drop,
however, and that dynamic could increase net donations. Whatever the result, donors would be making decisions based on a set of information with
more integrity behind it.

306. For some illustrations of this phenomenon, see, for example, Lee Benham, The Effect of
Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L & ECON. 337, 337 (1972); C. Robert Clark, Advertising Restrictions and Competition in the Children’s Breakfast Cereal Industry, 50 J.L. & ECON.
757, 759–60 (2007); Jeffrey Milyo & Joel Waldfogel, The Effect of Price Advertising on Prices:
Evidence in the Wake of 44 Liquormart, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1081, 1081 (1999); see also J. Howard
Beales, III et al., In Defense of the Pfizer Factors, in THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC
86–87 (James Campbell Cooper ed., 2013) (discussing how advertising reduces prices).
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Further, if more charities play by these rules, and if donors know to look
for charities that play by these rules, honest charities should benefit over charities that decline to make the candor commitment. In essence, a successful
implementation of these reforms would enhance “the respect and trust” for
philanthropy that the original Donor Bill of Rights drafters sought to promote
in their preamble.
Self-regulation and policing should serve charitable organizations well,
avoiding compliance costs. Watchdog groups could use an updated Donor
Bill of Rights as a new measuring stick for rating charities and for general
public education. However, if still needed, adoption and proliferation of the
Donor Bill of Rights could enhance opportunities for public enforcement.
C. The Last Resort: Additional Enforcement
Regulation of charitable speech through formal rulemaking and enforcement would prove expensive for the charitable institutions that the public
wishes to support. 307 However, the FTC and the states need not promulgate
a candor rule for charitable solicitations and communications in order to enjoy the desired effect. The FTC and state attorneys general could, of course,
put their moral weight behind this effort with some support and endorsement.
Furthermore, if charities expressly adopt a revised Donor Bill of Rights,
it could become a material claim. Such a claim would require the charitable
entity to incorporate its commitment to candor and scrupulously ethical communications as a material, independent representation, the force of private
and public law could follow. Donors, the FTC, and attorneys general would
have that extra hook of “failure to meet the candor representation,” if pursuing enforcement. 308 If policymakers firmly wished to push a candor commitment, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) could require organizations to
make and disclose their candor commitment in order to receive tax-exempt
status—just as the IRS requires of tax-exempt organizations in other areas. 309
Of course, a heavy regulatory hand should not be used until private approaches have been exhausted, and even then, not without firm evidence of

307. Additionally, First Amendment concerns surface. Some courts have construed Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 618 (1980), as establishing a “strict
scrutiny” standard for regulation of content of charitable speech. Id. at 636; see, e.g., Recycle for
Change v. City of Oakland, 856 F.3d 666, 673 (9th Cir. 2017); Planet Aid v. City of St. Johns, 782
F.3d 318, 330 (6th Cir. 2015). In Recycle for Change, the court found the ordinance at issue was
content neutral, and thus applied intermediate scrutiny. 856 F.3d at 674.
308. See supra Section II.A. (discussing of application of misrepresentation, fraud, and promissory fraud.)
309. See generally IRS Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (OMB No. 1545-0056) (2017) (requiring provision of information in organizing documents, narrative descriptions of activities, and disclosure of conflicts
of interest policies, among other items).
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the costs and benefits of regulation. 310 More broadly, private philanthropy
groups should draft and urge adoption of a revised Donor Bill of Rights that
incorporates this proposed candor change. Some entities will prove reluctant
to restrain their normal fundraising practices, let alone increase their civil
exposure through a candor rule. So, the sector, in considering this proposal,
would have a great deal to weigh.
IV. CONCLUSION
The American charitable sector is a marvel, in size, impact, and social
innovation. Funding, particularly from individuals, provides lifeblood to the
sector. Also, charitable donations comprise a significant consumer transfer
of wealth. Given these factors, enhancing the integrity of charitable solicitations, which drive a substantial amount of giving, 311 should become a renewed priority for leaders in the charitable sector, and if necessary, for regulators.
When solicitations lower the implicit price of goods by obfuscating the
true incremental impact of a donation, signals are distorted. Donors purchase
incremental charitable goods and services that they did not wish to purchase.
Charities that do not obfuscate the use of donations lose out because their
implicit price for the same charitable production would be higher. In some
instances, these problems are serious enough to warrant an analogy to common law fraud and misrepresentation.
The information flow in charitable solicitation, and thus the impact of
donation, can be improved along several key dimensions by a renewed commitment to candor. The charitable sector can lead the way by adopting and
self-enforcing new practices, but government enforcement looms as a potential alternative. Whichever path, the special position that charities hold
should mean that they afford donors integrity that matches public trust.

310. See Friedman, supra note 24, at 879–88 (describing the evolution of FTC’s cost-benefit
analysis).
311. See Bekkers & Wiepking, supra note 34, at 924.

